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and MARY KAY KANE**
It is trite but true to observe that disputes between United States
nationals and people from other lands have been increasing steadily and
doubtless will continue to do so. More and more, our commercial fates
are intertwined. Accordingly, the phenomenon of litigation in the courts
of the United States against people, both natural and corporate, from
other countries will be more common in the future than it has been in the
past. Such a trend should cause us to pause to reconsider whether what
we have developed as practice in the past ought to be applied unthink-
ingly to the future as well.
As in all civil litigation, courts confronted with suits against alien
defendants must determine two preliminary questions' in order to ensure
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1. In suits brought in federal courts a third question must be asked: Does the court have
subject matter jurisdiction over the particular controversy involved? See generally C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (4th ed. 1983). That particular inquiry is not part of
our concern. The federalism principles that underlie restrictions on federal court power over
particular controversies may be capable of different interpretations or they may be subject to
special statutory regulation when aliens are parties to litigation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1330
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that whatever judgment is reached comports with due process and thus is
enforceable. These questions are (1) can personal jurisdiction 2 properly
be asserted over the alien defendant, and (2) has adequate notice of the
suit been given to the defendant? The applicability of these two require-
ments to suits against alien defendants cannot be doubted since the
courts long have recognized that our due process guarantees are available
to "persons" whether or not they are citizens of the United States. 3
Some serious questions, however, can and should be raised as to whether
these prerequisites should be treated differently when alien defendants
are involved and, if so, how? It is these issues that motivate this Article.
Two events of legal significance, one immediately past and the other
imminent, make an exploration of this topic particularly important now,
lest our failure to rethink these questions allows us to lapse into un-
thought practice as if by default. First, the Supreme Court recently has
acknowledged that cases involving alien defendants may require some
specialized attention when testing the constitutionality of a state court's
assertion of jurisdiction. Although the Court seemed almost intention-
ally to forgo 4 an excellent opportunity to address the question in its 1984
decision in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 5 the need
for special treatment was made explicit in the Court's 1987 decision in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.6 Unfortunately, the Court
failed adequately to come to grips with what special consideration ought
to be given, and instead limited itself to the mere recognition that courts
should be aware of the special burdens imposed on aliens defending here
when assessing the fairness of asserting jurisdiction over them.7 A
clearer, more carefully articulated consideration of what special concerns
are involved, and what constitutional constraints exist, is necessary for
future guidance.
(1982) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). The resolution of those problems, however, rests
on concerns about the balance of power between the state and federal governments, rather
than concerns about the territorial powers of the United States as they may conflict with other
countries. This Article focusses on questions dealing with the latter problem and, thus, is
limited to the two preliminary issues of whether proper personal jurisdiction over an alien
defendant can be asserted and whether and how adequate notice can be accomplished.
2. The term personal jurisdiction as used here embraces actions in which jurisdiction is
asserted premised on service of process (in personam), as well those based on the attachment of
some property owned by the defendant (quasi in rem or in rem).
3. Due process rights are guaranteed for all "persons," which necessarily includes
aliens. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 34-45.
5. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
6. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
7. Id. at 1034-35.
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The second feature event that makes our inquiry most timely is the
publication of the American Law Institute's new Restatement of the Law,
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised). Although that doc-
ument speaks to future practice and undoubtedly will be very influential
on this topic, it fails to provide the necessary guidance. On jurisdictional
issues it calmly accepts the notion that the criteria for exercising jurisdic-
tion should be "basically the same" as in interstate cases8 and never ex-
amines why this is so or how they may differ. Although criticism for not
moving into uncharted waters may be unfair, if the Institute's role is lim-
ited merely to restating, there is danger that this bland assumption as
well as the statement of black letter categories of proper and improper
jurisdiction settings9 will solidify the law before we ever have the oppor-
tunity to reconsider. So before echoes of our past have become unsuited
regulators of our future, some exploration is required.
Our approach will be twofold. As the title suggests, we will begin by
examining the problems surrounding the question of whether to exercise
jurisdiction over an alien defendant. Although it is true that in some
instances a failure of notice deprives the court of jurisdiction,10 and that
the failure either to have a proper jurisdictional nexus with thd forum or
to provide constitutional notice will mean that the ensuing judgment can
be collaterally attacked as an invalid exercise of the court's jurisdiction,1 I
it is important to keep in mind that the two concepts are distinct con-
straints on the courts.12 Thus, in this Article we will treat issues of judi-
cial power and notice separately.1 3 We will look first at the current law
concerning when jurisdiction can be asserted constitutionally, exploring
why and where that law should be rethought and suggesting a model
8. "Although nearly all of the leading cases in the United States involved interstate
transactions or claims brought by one resident and citizen of the United States against another,
the criteria for exercise of judicial jurisdiction are basically the same as for claims arising out of
international transactions or involving a non-resident alien as a party." RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 421, reporter's
note 1 (Tent. Final Draft, July 1985) [hereinafter REsTATEMENT].
9. Id. § 421(2).
10. E.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 25 (1971).
11. See Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13, 24 (1928).
12. The Supreme Court itself has recognized the importance of keeping the issues ofjudi-
cial power separate from notice. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 313 (1950).
13. Keeping jurisdiction and notice questions separate also comports with the way those
matters are treated in most civil law countries in which notice is tested typically only when
there is a default. See deVries & Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in PersonalActions--A Comparison of
Civil Law Views, 44 IOWA L. REv. 306 (1959).
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approach to be followed. 14 Then we will turn to an exploration of the
notice question, examining the various rules, statutes, conventions, and
treaties that control when service of process is made on alien defend-
ants.15 In addition to providing a framework for accomplishing notice in
this setting, we hope to answer along the way some of the difficult
problems that have surfaced in applying the existing criteria.
The final matter that will be addressed is the one that every lawyer
should consider when deciding where to file suit. That question is
whether a judgment obtained against an alien defendant using our model
approach could be enforced abroad if necessary. 16 Although a world-
wide answer to that question cannot be offered with certainty, some gen-
eral indications can be found by looking at practices in some of the major
commercial nations. In addition, by contrasting our notions of when it is
proper to assert jurisdiction over a defendant with those of other coun-
tries, we can assess whether the adoption of our proposed scheme would
be perceived as an exercise of "exorbitant" jurisdiction, which might
cause international strife rather than cooperation.
I. Standards for Exercising Jurisdiction Over Alien Defendants
The propriety of asserting jurisdiction over an alien defendant de-
pends upon finding an appropriate long-arm statute (or attachment stat-
ute if property is found in the relevant jurisdiction) and then determining
whether the exercise of jurisdiction under that statutory scheme is consti-
tutional. There are some specialized federal long-arm statutes dealing
with the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants outside United States'
borders in certain kinds of actions 17 and a special federal provision for
suits against foreign governments. 18 For the most part, however, jurisdic-
14. See infra text accompanying notes 17-164.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 165-226.
16. The relationship between jurisdiction and judgments may not be as symbiotic in the
international realm as it is in the United States where the full faith and credit clause compels
this inquiry. See infra text accompanying notes 233-57. Nonetheless, the desire to promote
international recognition and avoid potential strife over excessive assertions of jurisdiction
makes this inquiry significant, as well as one of practical utility. See von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1126-27 (1966).
17. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 22, 25 (1982) (antitrust); id. §§ 77v, 78aa (securities); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1655 (1982) (action for lien enforcement). In fact these statutes act as long-arms for any
nonresident living outside the United States, whether an alien or not, by authorizing service
wherever the defendant may be found.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982). The provision is part of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, which sets out exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state. Once
the court finds an applicable exception and proper service is accomplished, jurisdiction is
proper. Thus, § 1605 has been treated as effectively authorizing long-arm jurisdiction in those
same categories. See, e.g., Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281, 1286-87 (E.D.
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tion over alien defendants will be asserted under the generally applicable
state long-arm statutes 19 and no peculiar problems of statutory interpre-
tation exist as a result of the international or alien character of the
defendant.
It is the question of what constitutional criteria are appropriate for
testing the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresident alien defendants20
that poses a problem. A good vehicle for portraying the issue is World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,21 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1980. Four defendants were sued in an Oklahoma
state court for injuries arising out of alleged deficiencies of an Audi auto-
mobile. They were Seeway, the New York retail dealer that sold the car
to the plaintiffs; World-Wide, the regional distributor for a three state
area; Volkswagen of America, the importer; and Audi, the German man-
ufacturer. Audi made no objection to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma
state court. The other three did and, upon losing, Seeway and World-
Wide pursued their objections through the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The outcome should be familiar and needs only a brief statement
here: applying and refining principles announced in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 22 the Supreme Court ruled that the persistent defend-
ants had inadequate contacts with Oklahoma to support jurisdiction. As
to the other two, the case did not speak at all because Volkswagen of
America gave up early, and Audi raised no objection even at the trial
level.23 It is the hypothetical outcome and reasoning as to the German
Pa. 1981), aff'd mem., 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp.
1097, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd on other grounds, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979). Another
provision in the Act specifically proscribes prejudgment attachment as a means of obtaining
jurisdiction over this class of defendant by limiting the courts' subject matter jurisdiction to in
personam actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982). See Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Proce-
dural Compass, 34 STAN. L. Rnv. 385, 402-10 (1982).
19. State long-arm statutes apply not only in state courts, but also in the federal courts by
virtue of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
20. There should be little doubt that jurisdiction over resident aliens should be subject to
the same constitutional standards as those applied in cases against United States citizens. For
example, if a Vietnamese national is now permanently residing in California, suit should be
possible in California state or federal courts. Similar conclusions apply for corporations whose
only claim to alien status is that they incorporated in the Bahamas, for example. See infra note
33. The question whether special treatment is required arises in suits against nonresident
aliens and is limited to whether jurisdictional assertions over them necessitate or allow the
development of standards different from those used to control state court assertions over indi-
viduals and corporations not resident within the forum state.
21. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
22. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23. In dictum, the Court suggested that jurisdiction over the international manufacturer
and national importer might have been proper. It commented that if the defendant purpose-
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manufacturer that this Article addresses. Would it be correct to say that,
if it had objected, the German manufacturer should be governed by the
same principles as those applied to Seeway and World-Wide? If not,
then what should control?
A. The Judicial Approach to Date
A brief review of some of the lower court decisions that have con-
fronted challenges to jurisdiction made by alien defendants reveals no
clear answer.24 In some cases the courts and the parties seem not even to
have recognized that the nonresident defendant's status as an alien might
suggest that a different inquiry would be appropriate. Rather, they have
treated the review of jurisdiction as a straightforward issue of whether
the International Shoe25 criteria were met: that is, whether the defendant
had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the asser-
tion of jurisdiction would not offend notions of fair play and substantial
justice.
2 6
Those courts that have recognized the question have responded in
one of two ways. The first is represented by those that have seemed to
fully catered to a national market by distributing its product there, it might be sued in any
state where the product malfunctioned. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.
Although the validity of this stream-of-commerce position may be questioned in light of the
Court's more recent decision in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026
(1987), see infra note 49, that need not concern us here. The distinction in World- Wide Volk-
swagen did not rest on the fact that the manufacturer was an alien corporation, whereas the
protesting defendants were within the United States, but rather on the type of activity in which
the various defendants engaged.
24. See R. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 4.06[5] (1983); Toran, Federalism,
Personal Jurisdiction, and Aliens, 58 TUL. L. REV. 758, 773-82 (1984).
25. Despite the grandiose company name of International Shoe, there was nothing inter-
national about that company, which was a Missouri manufacturing corporation. The princi-
ples developed in that case thus pertained to the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants
residing in states other than the forum.
26. E.g., Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Grevas v. M/V Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65, 68 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 495 (5th Cir. 1974); Scovill Mfg.
Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 461 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1972); Dean Mktg., Inc. v. AOC Int'l
(U.S.A.) Ltd., 610 F. Supp. 149, 152 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Rogers v. Icelandair/Flugleider, Int'l,
522 F. Supp. 670, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Quaker Oats Co. v. Chelsea Indus., Inc., 496 F. Supp.
85, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Ams., Inc. v. Banco Nacional de
Fomento Cooperativo, 485 F. Supp. 490, 493 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Yoder v. Yamaha Int'l Corp.,
331 F. Supp. 1084, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see also Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps,
S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1985) (Wisconsin exporter permitted to bring suit against
Greek steel company for nonacceptance of goods when delivery and inspection took place in
the United States). At least one other court has confronted the issue, but failed to find a
distinction between international trade and interstate commerce. See Gorso v. Bell Equip.
Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1027, 1032 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
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give heightened scrutiny to the fairness of asserting jurisdiction when a
nonresident alien defendant was involved, although they have not agreed
on how this standard differed or was to operate.27 The second approach
has been to adjust the way in which minimum contacts may be satisfied,
allowing consideration of the defendant's contacts with the nation as a
whole,28 rather than simply those with the forum. 29 The premise under-
27. Some courts, while acknowledging that the presence of an alien defendant may sug-
gest that fifth, rather than fourteenth, amendment considerations control, nevertheless have
asserted that the International Shoe criteria apply. See, e.g., American Land Program, Inc. v.
Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 n.1 (10th Cir. 1983). They
then may adjust the fairness inquiry to take account of the special burdens that might be
involved.
The Ninth Circuit has issued several opinions expressing the notion that the reasonable-
ness criteria must be applied with caution in the international context, suggesting that factors
of particular importance are: the potential travel burden on the alien defendant, the burden on
the plaintiff if the alternative forum is in another country, and the notion that the sovereignty
barrier may be higher when a foreign national is defending (although it never has explained
how that factor operates). E.g., Pacific Atl. Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325,
1330-31 (9th Cir. 1985); Paccar Int'l, Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K., 757 F.2d
1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1985); Olsen v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 649-50 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 (1984); Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (9th Cir.
1983); Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, S.A., 707 F.2d 395, 398 (9th Cir. 1983);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270-73 (9th Cir. 1981); see
also Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 319 (D. Md.
1983) (adopting the Ninth Circuit approach).
Other courts have emphasized the special unfairness to the plaintiff when no alternative
United States forum exists and that no interstate interests exist in the international realm to
urge dismissal. See, e.g., American Land Program, 710 F.2d at 1453; Centronics Data Com-
puter Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F, Supp. 659, 664 (D.N.H. 1977); Engineered Sports
Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 729 (D. Utah 1973).
The Texas Supreme Court in Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638
S.W.2d 870, 875 (1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 468 (1984), approached the jurisdiction question by
balancing the conveniences for the American plaintiffs who would have to sue in a foreign
country against the large international business, and finding a special state interest in providing
a forum under such circumstances.
Finally, other courts simply have acknowledged that when applying the Shoe criteria to
foreign commerce, caution must be exercised. See Deutsch v. West Coast Mach. Co., 80
Wash. 2d 707, 717, 497 P.2d 1311, 1317, cert denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972). In contrast, one
district court suggested that when alien defendants are involved there is no reason based on
fairness to prefer one forum over another. See Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F.
Supp. 287, 292 (D. Conn. 1975).
28. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (9th
Cir. 1985) (securities fraud action); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1028-29
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) suit); Gemini Shipping, Inc. v.
Foreign Trade Org. for Chem. & Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1981) (FSIA); Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1981)
(FSIA), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elec.
(U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (antitrust suit); Meadows v. Dominican
Republic, 628 F. Supp. 599, 606-07 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (FSIA), aff'd, 817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1987); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 616
F. Supp. 660, 665 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (FSIA); Paulson Inv. Co. v. Norbay Secs., Inc., 603 F.
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lying those decisions is that because the action is in federal court and
based on some federal law, fifth amendment rather than fourteenth
amendment due process controls, thus allowing for a national contacts
approach. 30 But even this last approach has not been without contro-
versy, 31 and several cases have limited its utility to situations in which a
Supp. 615, 618 (D. Or. 1984) (securities action); Bankers Trust Co. v. Worldwide Transp.
Servs., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1101, 1109-10 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (FSIA); Engineering Equip. Co. v.
S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709-10 (S.D.N.Y.) (admiralty), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164
(1978); Cryomedics, 397 F. Supp. at 290 (patent infringement); Engineered Sports Prods. v.
Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973) (patent infringement); Holt v. Klos-
ters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (admiralty); Alco Standard Corp.
v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (rescission of stock purchase agreement).
29. Many cases taking a national contacts approach also suggest that specialized fairness
concerns are applicable to alien defendants. E.g., Texas Trading & Milling, 647 F.2d at 315-16
n.37; Engineered Sports Prods., 362 F. Supp. at 729.
30. Various commentators have explored the use and propriety of the national contacts
approach in the federal courts. Articles focussing on its use under special federal statutes gen-
erally have urged the adoption of that approach. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Personal Jurisdiction
and Venue in Private Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy Analysis, 67 IOWA L.
REV. 485, 498-505 (1982); Kane, supra note 18, at 405. Reactions have been more mixed over
the question whether the federal courts generally could adopt a nationwide contacts approach
under the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 56-60 (1984) (use of nationwide con-
tacts rejected as unconstitutional); Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction Over Foreign-Country Corporate
Defendants-Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 OR. L. REV. 431, 453-54 (1984) (national
contacts should be used in cases against foreign defendants); Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic
and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 116-17 (1983) (national contacts of alien defendants
cannot be used without congressional expansion of statutory authority); Note, Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Limitations on Nationwide Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B.U.L. REV. 403, 417
(1981) (fifth amendment allows use of nationwide contacts); Note, National Contacts As a Basis
for In Personam Jurisdiction over Aliens in Federal Question Suits, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 686, 687
n.12, 698-99 (1982) (nationwide contacts can be used only in federal question suits and only if
Congress enacts a statute or rule 4 is amended)[hereinafter Note, National Contacts]; Note,
Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95
HARV. L. REV. 470, 481-86 (1981) (aggregate nationwide contacts should be used in all federal
question suits and should be implemented by Congress).
31. The controversy is exemplified by the majority and dissenting opinions in the en banc
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415
(5th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub. nom. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 108 S. Ct. 404
(1987). The majority held that since the Commodity Exchange Act contains no service provi-
sions, the federal courts' jurisdictional reach is governed by rule 4 and the application of the
Louisiana long-arm statute, limited by an assessment of state contacts. Id. at 422-27. Judge
Wisdom, writing for the dissent, disagreed.
Statutes and rules should be construed so as not to reach an irrational result. Here
there is a bizarre hiatus in the Rules.... When there is a hiatus in the Federal Rules
the district court may establish its own ad hoc rule, provided that it is fair and rea-
sonable and not inconsistent with any of the express rules. In a federal question
action, aggregating a defendant's national contacts is analogous to aggregating state
contacts in a diversity case. Aggregation of national contacts is a fair and reasonable
ad hoc solution to the problem.
Id. at 428. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that federal courts have no authority to
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specific federal long-arm statute is involved.32 Further, its restriction to
federal courts has led to unequal treatment depending on the forum in
which the plaintiff to files suit.
The Supreme Court has been slow to address this question. Its first
review33 of a jurisdictional challenge by an alien defendant came in 1984,
when it decided Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.34 The
create a federal rule for service. 108 S. Ct. at 413. Thus, since there was no federal long-arm,
the Louisiana statute controlled. The Court never reached the constitutional question, id. at
409 n.5, because it found that the state statute did not permit jurisdiction on the facts
presented. Id. at 411.
32. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 295 (3d Cir.) (patent infringement;
but since no nationwide service statute cannot aggregate national contacts), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 382 (1985); Pacific Atl. Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir.
1985) (although admiralty, state long-arm applies so only forum contacts relevant); Delames
v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir.) (admiralty action, but state long-
arm), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981); Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032,
1036 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (diversity suit so state contacts control); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416-19 (9th Cir. 1977) (trademark action and neither Ne-
vada long-arm nor Lanham Act can be construed to allow national contacts); Superior Coal
Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G, 83 F.R.D. 414, 418-20 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (antitrust and anti-dumping
suit rejecting national contacts without federal statute authorizing); Amburn v. Harold Forster
Indus., Ltd., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (patent infringement, but since state
long-arm used, state contacts necessary); Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D.
393, 400 (D. Neb. 1976) (patent, but in absence of federal long-arm cannot use nationwide
contacts).
33. It might be said that the Supreme Court had an earlier opportunity to confront the
special status of alien defendants in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952). The case presented the problem of whether Ohio had to decline jurisdiction over a
Philippine corporation on a cause of action unrelated to Ohio. The Supreme Court answered
"no," without particular reference to the fact that an alien corporation was defending. The
Court, however, should not be criticized for dodging the issue. In fact, as recognized in an
earlier California opinion involving the same underlying dispute, the actual contest was a mari-
tal property dispute between two Americans. The Benguet Mining Company became involved
only when the American wife sought to attach some of her husband's stock in the corporation
and sought damages because of the company's failure to issue the stock in her name. See
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 720, 725-32, 132 P.2d 70, 76-80
(1942). Additionally, the defendant, although organized in the Philippines, no longer was do-
ing business there because its operations had been interrupted by the Japanese occupation
during World War II. Its headquarters had been moved to Ohio, which became the center of
its administrative activity. Thus, the Court was not confronted with a truly alien corporation,
organized and carrying on its principal activities outside the United States. It is this latter type
of corporation that is of interest here. Corporations who merely are incorporated in countries
other than the United States, but whose principal activities and headquarters remain in the
United States do not present a case for special treatment. To rule otherwise would be to ignore
the territorial interests of our country and to allow parties to avoid those interests (or at least
remove themselves from the ordinary application of our jurisdictional standards) merely by
incorporating elsewhere. The concern raised in this Article is whether corporations that are
truly alien, as well as individuals who are nonresidents and noncitizens of the United States,
should require some special treatment for jurisdictional purposes.
34. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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case was a wrongful death action brought in the Texas state courts
against a Colombian corporation (Helicol) and others for an accident oc-
curring in Peru when one of the defendant's helicopters crashed. Helicol
was in the business of transporting persons by helicopter for various
companies working in South America. The crash occurred while Helicol
was performing one of these transportation arrangements-an agreement
that had been negotiated in Texas. The Court declared that "Helicol's
contacts with the State of Texas were insufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '35 Its
analysis rested on a finding that the minimum contacts threshold for as-
serting jurisdiction had not been crossed because none of Helicol's con-
tacts with the state of Texas36 were sufficient to establish general
jurisdiction in Texas. 37 No recognition was given to the fact that Helicol
was an alien defendant; it was treated as though it were an Oklahoma
foreign corporation involved in the same controversy. 38
The Court's silence on this point cannot be explained adequately,
39
particularly in light of the concurring opinion by Justice Campbell in the
Texas Supreme Court.40 He raised several of the international questions
that begged to be answered. First, he suggested that the Texas court did
not have the same problem facing it as had the United States Supreme
Court in the World- Wide Volkswagen case.41 "We do not have a dispute
35. Id. at 418-19.
36. Four contacts were identified: (1) defendant's chief executive officer had flown to
Texas to negotiate the transportation contract that ultimately led to the tragic flight; (2) de-
fendant had purchased most of its helicopters from a Fort Worth company over the years; (3)
defendant had sent prospective pilots and management personnel for training in Texas; and (4)
the checks paying for its transportation services were drawn on a Texas bank and paid into a
New York account. Id. at 416-17.
37. When the case came from the Texas Supreme Court, it was characterized as one in
which the cause of action neither arose out of nor was related to defendant's activities in Texas
so that general jurisdiction rather than specific jurisdiction was needed, thereby requiring a
greater showing of contacts. Id. at 413-16. This characterization of the case was challenged by
the dissent. See id. at 420-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). There was, however, no suggestion by
either the majority or the dissent that anything other than a traditional fourteenth amendment
analysis was in order.
38. For a cogent and detailed critique of the Helicopteros case, see Weinberg, The Heli-
copter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 913 (1985).
39. Professor Weinberg has pointed out that both Helicol in its brief in the Supreme
Court and the Justice Department, which filed an amicus brief, had argued that there would be
unfavorable repercussions for the balance of payments if jurisdiction were assumed and a judg-
ment entered in accordance with American law. Id. at 929.
40. 638 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tex. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
41. In fact, other lower courts also have noted that the World-Wide Volkswagen sover-
eignty concerns may be different from the sovereignty concerns raised in international cases.
E.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981);
Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty., Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203 n.4
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over jurisdiction between coequal sovereigns in a federal system. We are
deciding jurisdiction between countries; as to citizens of the United
States and a resident of Colombia. Therefore, 'due process' in this case
must be universal in its application." 42 He then went on to conclude that
jurisdiction was proper noting, among other things, that it would be "un-
reasonable to require the widows and children seeking relief here to go to
a foreign country to prosecute their action. '43 According to Justice
Campbell, this concern gave the Texas court a special interest in assuring
plaintiffs a forum "at least when that interest is not adequately protected
by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum country." 44 Despite this
clear language in the lower court, the Supreme Court refused to address
those concerns, applying a straightforward minimum contacts analysis
and never seeming to acknowledge whether defendant's alien status
might present some special considerations.
45
Three years later the Court apparently decided to confront the ques-
tion whether special concerns properly are considered when determining
the propriety of jurisdiction over alien defendants. The case, Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court4 6 arose out of a motorcycle accident in
California. The plaintiff sued the Taiwanese manufacturer of the motor-
cycle tires (Cheng Shin) in California state court, claiming that the acci-
dent was caused by defects in its product. The defendant cross-claimed
against Asahi, the Japanese manufacturer of the valve stem, seeking in-
demnification. Asahi sought to quash the summons arguing that juris-
diction over it was unconstitutional. 47 As the record revealed, Asahi
made no direct sales to California; its sale of the allegedly defective valve
stem took place in Taiwan where it shipped its product to Cheng Shin.
Asahi was aware that its product was incorporated into tires that were
being shipped around the world, including the United States, but an affi-
davit of the president of the company declared that it did not foresee that
(D.C. Cir. 1981). Although others specifically have equated the two. E.g., Paccar Int'l, Inc. v.
Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K., 757 F.2d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1985).
42. Helicopteros, 638 S.W.2d at 875.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. The Helicopteros Court did refer to Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S.
437 (1952). 466 U.S. at 414-15. But, as noted earlier, supra note 33, that case, though involving
a Philippine corporation, never addressed the question whether that characteristic required
special consideration.
46. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
47. Jurisdiction had been obtained under California's long-arm statute, which authorizes
jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). Thus, Asahi's argument was that
California's assertion of jurisdiction was inconsistent with the fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess clause. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1030.
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its sales in Taiwan would subject it to suit in California. Jurisdiction
ultimately was sustained by the California Supreme Court on the theory
that Asahi knew that some of its valve stems were being distributed in
the state and benefited indirectly from the sale of tires by Cheng Shin in
California. Its intentional act of placing its product in the international
stream of commerce was sufficient to provide the basis for state court
jurisdiction.
48
The Supreme Court reversed, finding jurisdiction to be unconstitu-
tionally asserted. Although the Court divided on the question whether
the minimum contacts requirement could be satisfied by the stream of
commerce theory used by the California Supreme Court,49 eight mem-
bers of the Court agreed that the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi vio-
lated notions of fair play and substantial justice-the second prong of the
International Shoe standard-and reached that conclusion in large mea-
sure because of the special burdens placed on the alien defendant.5 °
The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, addressed the four
traditional factors that have been used to analyze the fair play standard:
the burden on the defendant; the interest of the forum state; the plain-
tiff's interest in obtaining relief, and the interest of the interstate judicial
system in efficient justice and in furthering fundamental substantive so-
cial policies. Each of these factors as applied to the facts of the case, with
its special international character, was found to suggest that jurisdiction
should not be asserted. The burden on Asahi was particularly severe
because of the distance between Japan and California and because it re-
quired the defendant to submit to a foreign nation's legal system. Justice
O'Connor concluded: "The unique burdens placed upon one who must
defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in
assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal juris-
diction over national borders.'51 Further, since the original California
plaintiff had settled his case and only the Taiwanese manufacturer with
48. 39 Cal. 3d 35, 47-49, 702 P.2d 543, 549-50, 216 Cal. Rptr. 385, 391-92 (1985), rev'd,
107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
49. Four justices, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, ruled that placing a product in the
stream of commerce without some evidence that defendant purposefully directed it toward the
forum state was insufficient to support jurisdiction. 107 S. Ct. at 1031-33. Four other justices,
in a concurring opinion by Justice Brennan, held that due process was satisfied if the defendant
was aware that the product was marketed in the forum state. Id. at 1035-38. Justice Stevens,
in an opinion joined by Justices White and Blackmun, stated that it was unnecessary to reach
the minimum contacts issue since the finding that jurisdiction was unfair and unreasonable
disposed of the case. Id. at 1038.
50. Id. at 1033-35. Justice Scalia did not join in this ruling and did not file a concurring
opinion explaining why.
51. Id. at 1034.
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its indemnity claim against the Japanese defendant remained, the inter-
ests of the alien cross-claim plaintiff, as well as the forum, were slight.
52
Finally, the Court noted that the procedural and substantive policies of
other nations whose interests might be affected by this litigation coun-
selled against the assertion of jurisdiction. Although recognizing that
those interests would not always require dismissal, Justice O'Connor
commented that
those interests, as well as the Federal interest in its foreign relations
policies, will be best served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness
of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwilling-
ness to find the serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by
minimal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.
53
So what does all this mean? First, we clearly are told that some
specialized treatment of jurisdiction is appropriate when a nonresident
alien is defending. No longer should the international character of the
defendant simply be ignored. Second, the Court suggests that this special
consideration is pertinent when determining fairness under the four-
teenth amendment. But exactly what these special fairness concerns are,
or how they operate, remain somewhat in question. In fact, the case does
little to clarify existing law, other than to underscore that the problem of
how to treat alien defendants is a real one.
One reason that the Asahi Court's analysis provides little guidance is
that on the facts of the case, the decision was easy-all factors pointed
toward dismissal. The Court had before it a foreign plaintiff and defend-
ant litigating a transaction (the rights under the indemnity agreement)
entered into outside the country. But how should the lower courts bal-
ance the fairness concerns if a local plaintiff is present-if, for example,
the injured plaintiff originally had sued Asahi? There is no guidance
from the Supreme Court, other than to say that a great deal of weight
should be given to the burdens imposed on the foreign defendant. Fur-
ther, if Asahi had shown additional contacts with California, would
those have been sufficient to overcome the fairness concerns exposed by
the Court? We only can speculate as to the answer.
So in large measure Asahi is not a much more helpful guide for fu-
ture jurisdiction inquiries than other lower court decisions that had rec-
52. In particular, the Court noted that the transaction on which the indemnification
claim was based took place in Taiwan so that it was not clear that California law should
govern, and that Cheng Shin had not shown that it was more convenient to litigate in Califor-
nia, rather than either Taiwan or Japan. Id. at 1034.
53. Id. at 1035. The Court quoted Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in United States v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) in support of special restraints in the interna-
tional field.
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ognized the unique problems inherent in the international character of
alien defendants, but had not formulated a coherent response to those
concerns.54 In fact, the case does not even answer the question whether a
national contacts approach might be used. Rather, the Court limited it-
self to addressing the case in the framework presented below.55 Since
that approach focussed on California contacts and the stream of com-
merce theory, no statement concerning the propriety of a broader view of
the relevant contacts was made. It might be argued that the Court es-
poused a general philosophy suggesting the need for extra protection for
alien defendants and that itself is inherently inconsistent with an ex-
panded contacts approach. It is just as easy, however, to understand the
approach taken by the Court as one that relies on the fairness peg of the
International Shoe standard to counterbalance whatever contacts ap-
proach is used.
A more serious criticism can be made of Asahi than simply the argu-
ment that it leaves too many unanswered questions. The problem with
the approach of the Asahi Court-and the parties who presented the
case-is that their underlying thesis is quite wrong. The due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment as applied to assertions of personal
jurisdiction has no bearing at all on what American courts can do to
foreigners. It regulates only what the courts of one American state can
do to persons who are in another American state. Thus the World- Wide
Volkswagen Court said "even if the forum State is the most convenient
location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power
to render a valid judgment. ' 56 In Asahi, Justice O'Connor simply trans-
formed this interest of the "several States" into the interests of nations.
57
Yet, it seems quite obvious to us, that an "instrument of interstate feder-
alism" very properly may regulate what Oklahoma can do to an Ameri-
54. See supra note 27.
55. In a footnote in the portion of her opinion dealing with contacts and with which three
other justices agreed, Justice O'Connor specifically noted that they were not ruling on the
question of whether Congress constitutionally could provide a statutory scheme for suits
against aliens that relied on a national contacts approach. 107 S. Ct. at 1033 n.*.
The Court refused another opportunity to address the national contacts argument in
Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 409 n.5 (1987). The case is discussed
supra note 31.
56. 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (emphasis added).
57. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1034. Prior to Asahi, some lower federal courts also had made
the same mistake. E.g., Paccar Int'l, Inc. v. Commercial Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K., 757 F.2d
1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 1985); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266,
1272 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959
(1st Cir. 1984).
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can car dealer located in New York, but may have no bearing at all on
what an Oklahoma state court can do to a German automobile manu-
facturer, or a California state court can do to a Japanese parts
manufacturer.58
In the international order, there is no such thing as Oklahoma.
Oklahoma is an address, not a state. It is a fabled land in musical com-
edy, where the corn grows as high as an elephant's eye and wind goes
sweeping across the plain. But it is just as mythical as Ruritania. It
fields no army, sails no navy, prints no stamps and coins no money.
Most important of all, it has no diplomatic relations and can conclude no
treaties. In short, it lacks every single attribute of a "state" for interna-
tional purposes. 59
Yet Oklahoma, even if not a state in the international sense, does
have courts. It is true that some are federal and some are state, and their
respective spheres are sharply defined. But in a world order of things,
those are simply American courts.6 0 How we choose to distribute our
judicial business by either geography or by subject matter is our own
business and, further, is a matter as to which Germany and Japan are
profoundly disinterested. If the Japanese courts ever are asked to enforce
a judgment against Asahi, their question would be: "Is this a valid Amer-
ican judgment?," not whether it would be valid internally within the
United States. 6
1
To reach this conclusion is not to say that Asahi or Audi are not
"persons" within the meaning of either the fourteenth or fifth amend-
ment.62 Due process is guaranteed by our assurances that no decision
will be reached without according those defendants notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. 63 But the fourteenth amendment as it has evolved in
the jurisdiction context provides protections in addition to and quite
apart from these procedural fairness guarantees to persons. Specifically,
it protects the concerns of sister states of this Union from transgressions
58. See Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Juris-
diction, 65 TEx. L. REV. 689, 739 n.220 (1987); Toran, supra note 24, at 772 n.70.
59. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 201 comment g.
60. International law "does not concern itself with the allocation of jurisdiction among
domestic courts." RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 421 comment f, at 435-36; see R.H.
GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAWS: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 619 (7th ed. 1974).
61. See Brenscheidt, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in
the Federal Republic of Germany, I I INT'L LAW. 261, 264 (1977); see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 227-78 (discussion of foreign judgment enforcement). To the extent that state
boundaries are used to limit the enforceability in the United States of an American judgment
against an alien, we thus may be unnecessarily restricting its potential enforcement abroad.
62. See supra note 3.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 165-226.
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by each other.64 This has been a consistent theme from Pennoyer v.
Neff65 through World-Wide Volkswagen. 66 Quite obviously neither Ger-
many nor Germans can claim any benefits that are accorded to the State
of New York or to persons because they are in or are from New York.
The due process clause is not a privileges and immunities clause. 67 Fur-
ther, the fact that aliens are guaranteed equal protection under the laws
does not preclude reasonable distinctions between aliens and citizens in
applying their due process safeguards. 68
To say that the minimum contacts approach of International Shoe
does not curtail the jurisdiction of American courts over alien defendants
does not mean that jurisdiction is unbounded. To find the proper point
of departure, we simply go back to an ancient landmark, Pennoyer v.
Neff, decided by the Supreme Court 110 years ago and ruling that as a
principle of international law, Oregon process could not run into Califor-
64. See Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdic-
tional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REV. 470, 484 (1981) ("the practice of considering only contacts
within the state-is dictated not by fairness, but by limits of the state's power"). The due
process guarantees in interstate cases are tied to the full faith and credit clause. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1. As recognized in Pennoyer v. Neff itself, that clause requires sister states to enforce
each other's judgments only when they have been entered in accordance with due process. 95
U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877). Professor Weinberg has argued that concerns about state interests are
not really a legitimate part of the jurisdiction inquiry; that states really do not care whether
jurisdiction is asserted over one of their own residents, as long as some forum is provided.
Further, she suggests that jurisdictional assertions in international cases pose no real threat to
the sovereignty of other nations; convenience alone matters. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 924.
Her arguments, however, ignore the fact that jurisdictional questions are inevitably tied to
judgments; the reason we strive so hard to assure the correctness of jurisdiction is in order to
obtain a judgment that will be enforceable anywhere. In the United States, full faith and credit
ensures that states will honor each other's decrees. If jurisdiction is lacking in the original
forum, then full faith and credit does not require another state to ignore its own sovereign
interests and enforce the judgment; indeed, it legitimately will assert its interest to ignore the
judgment. In the international realm, there is no full faith and credit guarantee to compel
enforcement; comity notions stemming from respect between nations (or sovereigns) alone
urge enforcement. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 46 (1959). Thus, there are
sovereignty concerns in international cases, but of a different order.
65. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
66. See Stein, supra note 58, at 689. It is true that in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982), the Court clarified the
reference in the World-Wide Volkswagen case to interstate federalism, noting that the restric-
tion was a result of the individual liberty interest of the defendant, rather than some independ-
ent state interest. The Court, however, then characterized the due process concern expressed
in International Shoe as one of balancing that interest against the question of state power. Id.
at 712. In the international setting, it is one of national power, as restrained by due process.
This difference was noted in Asahi, see supra text at note 51, although its ramifications were
not fully appreciated there.
67. Aliens cannot claim the protection of the privileges and immunities clause for it is
limited to "citizens." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 722(2).
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nia to commence a civil action. 69 Notions of sovereignty and territorial-
ity form the basis for limiting extraterritorial jurisdiction in the
international realm.70 Further, those notions seem naturally to suggest
that in the international context, the jurisdiction that matters is Ameri-
can jurisdiction, and not the more specific California jurisdiction. There
are, however, some constraints in international understanding. For ex-
ample, we have denounced somewhat the Helicopteros and Asahi Courts
for resting their decisions on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Do we therefore imply that those rulings are wrong in re-
sult? Certainly not intentionally. It is just that nobody can tell whether
they are right or wrong because they asked the wrong question. "Con-
tacts" has meaning internationally as well as domestically,71 but the con-
tacts that matter for the former are not limited to those with Texas or
California. 72 Had the question been put as "What contacts does
Helicopteros have with the United States?," we well might have found
much greater involvement than was shown in the case. So too with
Asahi. Substantial contacts might have justified jurisdiction by some
American court.
It is true that in a country as large as the United States, it may
matter which American court can act, and that determination embraces
some important notions of fairness. But this is a quite familiar problem.
We call it venue, not jurisidiction, and deal with it as a matter of place of
trial.
It also is certainly the rule that venue statutes as such typically give
short shrift to aliens. Most, like the federal rule, simply declare that an
69. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. Some commentators have criticized the Pennoyer Court's
use of international law concepts on the ground that they are not appropriate in the interstate
context. See Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1291, 1294-95 (1983); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.
Cr. REv. 241, 263-65; Jay, "Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction:
A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429, 452-54 (1981); Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Per-
sonal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112, 1115-16 (1981). Right
or wrong, these criticisms do not undercut the validity of the Court's statements regarding the
sovereignty basis for jurisdiction in the international order. Rather, they suggest the impropri-
ety of viewing the interstate and international cases through the same looking glass.
70. As explained by Justice Field in Pennoyer, there are two well-established principles of
public law governing jurisdictional assertions between independent states. First, "every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory."
95 U.S. at 722. Second, "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory." Id.
71. See infra note 79.
72. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 421, reporter's note 6, at 441 ("There is no inter-
national law impediment, however, to aggregating a foreign defendant's contacts with the
United States as a whole .... ").
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alien can be sued anywhere. 73 All that means, however, is simply that an
action can be filed anywhere. Whether fairness and convenience con-
cerns demand that it be dismissed, we consider under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.74 Ironically, even the Supreme Court recognized
this fact in another personal jurisdiction case not involving an alien, Bur-
ger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 75 in which Justice Brennan commented that
if the defendant's contacts with the forum are purposeful and sufficient to
cross the minimum contacts threshold, then most often other considera-
tions that would render jurisdiction unreasonable "may be accommo-
dated through means short of finding jurisdiction unconstitutional. '76
Therefore, fairness concerns involving where suit takes place need not be
abandoned if the jurisdictional inquiry in suits against alien defendants
properly is focussed solely on what contacts the defendant has had with
the nation as a whole. The burdens imposed by defending abroad rightly
may be considered on a forum non conveniens inquiry. 77
B. A Model Approach
To criticize the Supreme Court for failing to provide a satisfactory
approach to the problem of when it is proper to assert jurisdiction over a
nonresident alien without examining the alternative would itself be un-
fair. So, with all the temerity that is due, we now will advance and ex-
plore our proposed model approach.
Our approach consists of three parts. First, the question whether
personal jurisdiction properly may be asserted over an alien defendant
should be answered by a single inquiry78 into the kind and nature of
73. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1982).
74. In the federal courts, the question more often is whether the case should be trans-
ferred, rather than dismissed. See id. § 1404(a).
75. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
76. Id. at 477. Justice Brennan specifically suggested that clashes in law could be accom-
modated through choice of law rules and inconvenience by a change of venue.
77. See Ginsburg, The Competent Court in Private International Law: Some Observations
on Current Views in the United States, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 89, 99-100 (1965); Katzenbach,
Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International
Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1138 n.174 (1956).
78. Other commentators also have suggested that a single inquiry be used to test jurisdic-
tion over aliens, but their inquiry relies on an assessment of the reasonableness of asserting
jurisdiction given the inconveniences involved. See Toran. supra note 24, at 784-85; Weinberg,
supra note 38, at 924. This approach can be criticized on two grounds. First, it lacks a theo-
retical foundation by failing to give appropriate recognition to the role of foreign state sover-
eignty interests in jurisdiction. Second, it relies on a balancing standard to answer a question
of power and in so doing injects uncertainty in the international realm where certainty and
predictability are so important. Of course, reasonableness and inconvenience must be consid-
ered, but they should remain discretionary, nonconstitutional considerations. See infra text at
notes 92-93; see also Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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contacts the defendant has had with the United States as a whole.79 This
is true regardless of whether the court addressing the question is state or
federal or whether the case is premised on an alleged violation of state or
federal law.80 The concern with the personal jurisdiction inquiry is terri-
torial and the court deciding the issue is sitting in a very real sense as a
court of the nation, not as a court of the state. Thus, international con-
straints require only that there be substantial contacts with the country
as a whole; if there are, we may demand a foreign national to submit to
our courts.
81
In addition, the propriety of asserting jurisdiction premised on na-
tional contacts should not depend on whether jurisdiction is being as-
serted under a federal or state long-arm statute.82 Of course, there must
be statutory authorization to assert jurisdiction outside the borders of the
forum and thus a long-arm statute must exist and, depending on the cate-
gories authorized, this may have the effect of restricting jurisdiction from
79. The use of contacts, rather than relying solely on presence-the sole basis for jurisdic-
tion at the time of Pennoyer v. Neff-remains consistent with the approach recognized in the
international context, and reflects the understanding that in modem times a defendant may be
within the sovereign control of a jurisdiction by the nature of its activities, as well as by its
physical presence. See RESrATEMENT, supra note 8, ch. 2, introductory note at 431-32.
80. Notions of the source of governing law should be kept separate from the question
whether jurisdiction is proper. The Supreme Court long has asserted this proposition with
reference to questions of interstate jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215
(1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The propriety of this separation has
been questioned by some commentators. See Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law,
78 MIcH. L. REv. 872 (1980); Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Conse-
quences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 1031, 1038 (1978). Nonetheless, the need to
keep jurisdiction and choice of law questions separate is even clearer in the context discussed
in text because the determination of whether federal or state law controls rests not on territo-
rial concerns, but on federalism constraints that are immaterial in the international context.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 249-57.
82. The determination whether a given long-arm statute may be used requires an inquiry
into both whether the governmental authority that issued the statute intended it to cover the
particular defendant involved and whether, if it did, the Constitution will allow the assertion.
Although the constitutional issue obviously is intertwined, it is important to keep separate
these two inquiries. Statutory limitations may prevent jurisdiction from being asserted, even if
it would be constitutional to do so, and this also may be true when an alien is defending. The
reason for tolerating these nonuniform results is because each governmental unit is allowed to
decide for itself whether and when-its courts may assert jurisdiction. If there is a strong need
for uniformity, Congress always can enact a federal long-arm, making it exclusive. See, eg., 28
U.S.C. § 1605 (1982) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). In the absence of such action,
however, the fact that a state long-arm statute is utilized should not necessitate a different
constitutional analysis than when a federal statute is invoked. Both governmental units should
be under the same restraints (or lack of restraint). See DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.,
654 F.2d 280, 292-93 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
The failure to keep separate these two questions has contributed to the confusion in the lower
courts that have confronted the issue of whether a national contacts approach might be used.
See supra notes 28-32.
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its full territorial reach.8 3 That anomaly always has existed and simply
reflects the deference given to each court system to decide for itself how
far it wants to extend its reach. The key is to recognize that if there is a
statutory basis for asserting jurisdiction, the constitutional question re-
mains the same regardless of the statutory source. Constitutional au-
thority is premised on sovereign territorial power over the defendant
through his contacts with the nation.
The second part of our approach recognizes that due process in the
international setting is satisfied by an inquiry into the sufficiency of the
notice involved. The parameters of this independent requirement are dis-
cussed later.84 The third and final step simply acknowledges that insofar
as fairness concerns tied to convenience should play a role in the decision
to hear the case-and they should-they can be accommodated through
the application of forum non conveniens,8 5 as defined by the Supreme
Court most recently in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. 
86
The virtues of this three-part analysis would be many. As already
noted, 87 it is doctrinally sound and, as will be shown, 88 it is consistent
with international notions of the allocation of jurisdiction between sover-
eign nations. Additionally, such an approach avoids many of the
problems of predictability inherent in the balancing standard of mini-
mum contacts versus fair play and substantial justice. 89 The value and
desire for predictability in the international setting is particularly acute.
Further, on a practical level, the inquiry into national contacts is more
realistic, and should be one judges easily can apply given their long expe-
rience with the evaluation of state contacts.
83. E.g., Stabilisierungsfonds fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d
200, 203-04 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 165-226.
85. Some commentators who have balked at the use of a national contacts approach in
the absence of congressional action, nonetheless, have urged that if such a statute were en-
acted, convenience concerns could be handled adequately through forum non conveniens and
transfer. E.g., Note, National Contacts, supra note 30, at 701-03.
86. 454 U.S. 235 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982). The Piper case specifically
articulated the proper concerns on forum non only for the federal courts. Id. at 248 n. 13.
State courts generally have been left free to develop their own standards in this area. See
Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1217 n.3 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 347
(1985). However, as stated in the text, when the state court asserts jurisdiction over an alien
defendant it is sitting as a "court of the nation," and as such, properly should follow the
Supreme Court's lead. See Note, Civil Procedure-Long Arm Statutes-Jurisdiction Over Alien
Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1585, 1597-98 (1972); infra
text accompanying notes 150-52.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 58-72.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 227-78.
89. See supra note 78.
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Adjusting for fairness by use of forum non conveniens also has im-
portant practical advantages. First, the Supreme Court has had occasion
recently to refine its standards for forum non conveniens in the interna-
tional setting so there exists well-developed doctrine allowing for easy
application. 90 Second, it places convenience concerns in their proper per-
spective, keeping separate questions of sovereign power from those of
whether, in light of all the circumstances presented, jurisdiction should
be declined and the parties remitted to some other forum to settle their
dispute. Third, forum non offers the added possibility that the court can
adjust for potential inequities between the parties by using conditional
dismissals9 l-a device not available under the "black-or-white" approach
to jurisdiction.
Some commentators have urged that relying on forum non and
transfer to cure the problem of the inconvenient forum is insufficient be-
cause it leaves too much to court discretion; instead, the inconvenience
issue should be treated as a question of constitutional right.92 Their con-
clusions, however, fail to take account of the confusion that necessarily
results from utilizing a balancing standard resting on more than one
foundation. Moreover, in applying the International Shoe standard itself,
the finding of sufficient contacts as a practical matter seldom is overborne
by convenience concerns. The problem and prevailing question is how to
balance the two. If determinations of inconvenience (as well as considera-
tions of the forum's and foreign state's relative interests in the contro-
versy) need not be weighed against the finding of contacts, but, instead,
suggest that dismissal may be appropriate as a matter of discretion,93 a
clearer understanding of the standard may be achieved.
A closer look at how the national contacts approach and forum non
restraints would operate best may illustrate their advantages, as well as
answer some lurking questions. The remainder of this section will do
just that.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 117-28.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 136-42.
92. See Fullerton, supra note 30, at 35-36; Redish, supra note 69, at 1137-38.
93. See FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 257 (5th Cir. 1981). One argument
made against such a discretionary determination is that it prevents collateral attacks on
grounds of convenience and thus may deprive a defendant of his full right to challenge the
truly inconvenient forum. See Fullerton, supra note 30, at 37. Our failure to be persuaded by
this argument rests in part on the conviction that it is not unreasonable in and of itself (and
certainly not constitutionally) to require the defendant to raise his convenience objection in the
original forum. Further, to make the determination discretionary does not mean that the fo-
rum is unlikely to consider it seriously. If anything, keeping convenience as a separate concern
may better focus the courts' attention on what actually is at stake.
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(1) Territoriality and National Contacts: The Power Question
The assessment of an alien defendant's past contacts with the nation
as a whole so as to establish jurisdiction in any United States court
should proceed much as it has in those courts that have used a national
contacts approach when a nationwide service of process statute was in-
volved. 94 Indeed, it is not very different from that developed in the state
jurisdiction context95-we simply cast the net further. This means that
the court should evaluate the number and nature of the defendant's con-
tacts to determine whether they were sufficiently purposeful so as to sup-
port jurisdiction.96 Most important, the court in assessing the contacts
should consider their aggregate strength; a series of indirect contacts may
suffice to indicate that the defendant knowingly submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the American courts.
Thus, in evaluating whether sufficient contacts exist, the court still
may find a useful guide in the distinction between general and specific
jurisdiction: recognizing that a single indirect contact may be sufficient if
the cause of action arose out of that contact, but more must be shown if
the cause of action is unrelated.97 Illustratively, if a New York plaintiff
purchases a car while in Germany and has an accident there, the jurisdic-
tion determination in a later suit in New York against the manufacturer
will depend upon what contacts the German manufacturer has had in the
United States as a whole-more than one contact is required. It will not
matter for constitutional purposes, however, if no contacts are shown in
New York,98 if many exist in other states. But if the car is purchased
from a local manufacturer in New York and an accident then occurs in
Oklahoma, specific jurisdiction is available in Oklahoma without refer-
ence to whether other autos are distributed in that state or elsewhere in
the country. This would be true under the traditional state contacts ap-
proach as well. In effect, then, the adoption of a national contacts ap-
proach may make it easier to establish general jurisdiction, but should
have little impact on specific jurisdiction.
In a similar vein, if defendant's contacts can be demonstrated by the
94. See cases cited supra note 28.
95. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.11
(1985).
96. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
97. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984).
98. Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG of Wolfsburg, Germany, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d
895, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972). The lack of any direct contacts with the forum may mean that
the state long-arm statute cannot be used, however, and thus jurisdiction would be impermissi-
ble on statutory grounds. E.g., Gorso v. Bell Equip. Corp., 476 F.2d 1216, 1222-23 (3d Cir.
1973).
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stream of commerce approach 99 in the international setting, the focus
should be whether the alien directed its products toward the United
States markets generally.lc ° If so, it is not necessary to show that it
sought specifically to enter the forum state's markets or to benefit from
commerce there in order to find proper jurisdiction in that state.101
Despite these advantages, the use of a national contacts approach to
jurisdiction over aliens still leaves open some very knotty problems. For
example, there is considerable debate concerning the question of how to
treat parent and subsidiary corporations for jurisdiction purposes. Can
the contacts of one company be imputed to another alien corporation
because of the relationship between the two?' 0 2 The problem remains
even if a national contacts approach is followed because it is necessary to
99. The Asahi Court divided on the question of whether the stream of commerce theory
was appropriate. See supra note 49. The main difference between the justices, however, was
over whether there had to be evidence that defendant purposefully directed its product toward
the forum or whether it merely had to be aware the product was marketed there. In other
words, what indirect activity would be deemed a "contact?" It is not necessary for us to
resolve that issue here. Whichever view predominates, the focus should be on the stream of
commerce into the United States' market, not that of any particular state. See, e.g., Hall v.
Zambelli, 669 F. Supp. 753, 757 (S.D. W. Va. 1987) (direct stream of commerce into Penn-
sylvania used to substantiate jurisdiction in West Virginia).
100. Consider, for example, Le Manufacture Francaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Dis-
trict Court, 620 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1980). Plaintiffs sought damages for injuries arising from a
one-car accident in Colorado when one of defendant's tires allegedly failed. The tire was not
part of the normal chain of distribution but was purchased by an American serviceman when
in Germany who later shipped the auto to the United States and traded it to a Colorado dealer
who then sold it to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had no evidence of the sale of defendant's tires in
Colorado. Id. at 1045. They did, however, show wide distribution in the United States. Be-
cause the court applied a state contacts approach, it was necessary for it to draw an inference
from national sales that Michelin "indirectly seeks to serve a nationwide market, including
Colorado." Id. Further, because the particular tire was purchased outside the normal stream
of commerce, the Colorado Supreme Court felt obliged to try to find a tenuous connection
"relating" the sale of that tire to other inferred Colorado tire sales to support jurisdiction. Id.
at 1047. While the result reached by the court cannot be criticized, the tortuous path required
to get there can. A national contacts approach would make such adventures unnecessary.
101. See Hay, supra note 30, at 435-44. In fact the use of the stream of commerce theory
and nationwide contacts perspective combined may make it much easier to find general juris-
diction, with the effect that it will become less important to try to fit a case into the specific
jurisdictional category, thereby avoiding one more preliminary issue and argument over
whether the cause of action was or was not related to defendant's conduct.
102. See, e.g., Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (lst Cir.
1980); Newport Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elec. (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1335-40 (E.D.N.Y.
1981); Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 499 F. Supp. 829, 836-40
(D. Or. 1980); Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 528-31 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG of Wolfsburg, Germany, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 431-32, 278
N.E.2d 895, 897, 328 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 (1972). See generally R. CASAD, supra note 24,
3.02[2][b][ix], 4.03[5].
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determine what is a relevant contact. In situations in which the alien
corporation has no direct contacts with the United States, the only viable
way in which to assert jurisdiction over it would be to impute contacts of
a closely related company to it.
Additionally, there is the question of how attachment jurisdiction
should operate in the international setting.10 3 Until the Supreme Court's
1977 decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 104 it was well settled law that juris-
diction could be asserted over nonresident defendants if they owned
property within the territorial power of the forum state and that property
was seized prior to filing suit.10 5 These principles were derived, once
again, from Pennoyer v. Neff. 106 But the Shaffer Court ruled that juris-
diction should be determined under a uniform standard and that future
assertions of attachment jurisdiction should be tested against the Interna-
tional Shoe minimum contacts criteria. 10 7 Thus, the question may be
asked as to whether or how these developments should affect the use of
attachment jurisdiction when property is held by alien defendants.
We must begin from the same departure point as that in in per-
sonam cases. Shaffer, just as International Shoe, is limited to establish-
ing principles for the assertion of jurisdiction between states and
consequently does not necessarily control in the international arena. The
Shaffer Court's preference for a uniform standard for jurisdiction is not
inconsistent with that conclusion. It was premised on the notion that, as
between the states, it made no sense to be concerned about the fairness of
asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident when a long-arm statute was
used, and to ignore totally fairness concerns by relying solely on territo-
rial power because of the fortuity that the defendant owned some prop-
erty in the state. 108 But, as demonstrated earlier, 1 09 there is a justification
for developing a different standard to govern assertions of jurisdiction
over alien defendants,1 10 and the basis for that standard historically and
103. The practical need for resorting to attachment jurisdiction would be reduced if the
ability to obtain jurisdiction premised on national contacts and stream of commerce notions is
accepted. See, e.g., Papendick v. Bosch, 410 A.2d 148, 153-54 (Del. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 909 (1980).
104. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
105. For a discussion of attachment jurisdiction before and after the Shaffer decision, see
J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 95, §§ 3.8-.9, 3.14-.16.
106. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
107. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
108. Id. at 207-12.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 56-77.
110. In his concurring opinion in Shaffer, Justice Stevens noted that there might be some
reasons to reach a different conclusion on jurisdiction in the international context. 433 U.S. at
218-19. He did not, however, explore what exact differences might be appropriate.
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internationally is territoriality. Further, in the international arena, the
availability of attachment jurisdiction premised solely on the presence of
property may be justified because such jurisdiction may be the only
means of suing in the United States.I'I The Shaffer Court specifically did
not rule on the question whether the attachment of property alone was
sufficient to provide jurisdiction if no other forum were available.
12
Rather, its conclusions implicitly rested on the notion that it was not
necessary to rely on territorial principles because the defendants properly
might be sued in some state in which they had minimum contacts and
any judgment reached there could be enforced through the full faith and
credit clause. That reasoning, although compelling in interstate cases,
may be inapposite in international ones.
In summary, then, under our proposed approach, international sov-
ereignty interests are satisfied by the contacts of the defendant or its
agents with the nation as a whole or by the attachment of existing prop-
erty. 113 Concerns of fairness, in either case, will be addressed through
the application of forum non conveniens. Finally, insofar as there is con-
cern that attachment jurisdiction over aliens would be perceived as exces-
sive, 14 causing problems internationally, Congress always has the power
111. Some post-Shaffer cases have relied on this reasoning in upholding attachment juris-
diction. See Riesenfeld, Shaffer v. Heitner: Holding, Implications, Forebodings, 30 HASTINGS
L.J. 1183, 1197 (1979). In one case, a shipper asserted quasi in rem jurisdiction over funds in a
broker's account that were credited to a foreign defendant. The Second Circuit distinguished
Shaffer as a domestic case involving defendants who might have been sued elsewhere, whereas
the issue at bar was whether defendant could be sued in the United States at all, creating
elements of "jurisdiction by necessity." Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale
Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 654-55 (2d Cir. 1979). To the same effect, see Lour-
ing v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630, 633 (D. Conn. 1977). See also Biel v.
Boehm, 94 Misc. 2d 946, 950-51, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 234-35 (1978).
112. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37.
113. The natural consequence of this territorial argument also would support in personam
jurisdiction premised solely on a defendant being personally served with process when in the
United States, so called "tag jurisdiction." The viability of this form of jurisdiction in inter-
state cases remains unclear after Shaffer v. Heitner. See Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt,
779 F.2d 264, 268, 270-71 (5th Cir. 1985); R. CASAD, supra note 24, 2.04[2][c]. Typically,
arguments against it are premised on the inherent unfairness of requiring a defendant to defend
in a particular forum based on the fortuitous fact that service was accomplished there, as well
as the need to apply International Shoe to all forms of interstate jurisdiction. Of course,forum
non or transfer should operate to provide protection against egregious results. See, e.g., Opert
v. Smid, 535 F. Supp. 591, 594 (S.D. N.Y. 1982). But cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 421
comment e (" 'Tag jurisdiction' ... is not generally acceptable under international law."). Its
unacceptability, however, results from its potential for inherent unfairness, which will be con-
sidered on forum non under our approach.
114. The Revised Foreign Relations Restatement limits the use of attachment jurisdiction
to those cases in which "the thing is owned, possessed, or used in the state, but only in respect
of that thing or a claim reasonably connected with that thing." RESTATEMENT, supra note 8,
§ 421(2)(k). These limitations are premised on the applicability of Shaffer v. Heitner, and
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to provide by statute that jurisdiction is to be limited to in personam
cases. Indeed, that is exactly what was done for suits against foreign
governments. 115
(2) Forum Non Conveniens: The Prudential Concerns
Any examination of how forum non may be used to protect notions
of fairness as they relate to convenience' 1 6 must begin with a closer look
at Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. I " 7 The question presented was whether a
Pennsylvania federal district court""8 could dismiss a wrongful death ac-
tion arising out of a Scottish aircrash on grounds of forum non con-
veniens. The case was brought by a nominal California plaintiff on behalf
of the estates of five Scottish passengers killed in the crash against the
Ohio manufacturer of the propeller and the Pennsylvania manufacturer
of the plane engine. The Scottish pilot and British owners were not
joined as defendants. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that dismissal
was appropriate. Although the named defendants were Americans, the
principles enunciated in Piper are particularly apt in cases involving alien
defendants because the Court confronted major issues normally arising in
those cases. These issues include how the doctrine is to be applied when
the alternative forum is a foreign tribunal and the foreign law appears
much less favorable than American law, as well as what weight to give to
provisions in the European Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments,
declaring general jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property "exorbitant." Id. com-
ment i.
As already shown in text, Shaffer does not control the question. As to the European
Convention, two responses are appropriate. First, finding such jurisdiction exorbitant simply
means that any judgment based on that form of jurisdiction will not be recognized outside the
rendering state. That limitation on the scope of the judgment inheres in our own law, which
limits quasi in rem judgments to the value of the attached property. See Freeman v. Alderson,
119 U.S. 185, 187-88 (1886). See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra
note 95, § 3.8. Second, if there remains concern about the inherent fairness of such jurisdiction
and a desire not to appear internationally insensitive to claims that we are "overreaching,"
such concerns appropriately may be considered on a case by case basis during the forum non
conveniens inquiry.
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982); see also supra note 18.
116. Several courts have suggested that fairness/convenience concerns best may be han-
dled not by jurisdictional inquiries but through forum non. E.g., Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A.
v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1984); FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251,
257 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 843 (1985) (reliance on a discretionary standard is not
appropriate when considering fairness); Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search
of a Role, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (1986) (the concerns considered in forum non better
can be handled under the personal or prescriptive jurisdiction inquiry).
117. 454 U.S. 233 (1981).
118. The case actually was begun in the California state courts, removed to federal court
and then transferred to Pennsylvania. Id. at 239-40.
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the fact that an alien plaintiff is involved when balancing fairness
considerations.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,' 19 began his analysis by re-
affirming the forum non standard enunciated by the Court in 1947 in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.120 Under Gilbert the presumption is to honor
plaintiff's forum choice, allowing dismissal only when an alternative fo-
rum is available and when both the private interests tied to the litigants'
convenience and the public interests affecting the forum court's conven-
ience suggest that dismissal is appropriate. 121 Applying that standard to
the case at bar, the Court made several specific rulings of particular inter-
est in actions against alien defendants.
First, dismissal may not be barred solely because of an unfavorable
change in the law.122 Conversely, because convenience is at the heart of
forum non, dismissal may be appropriate if it is shown that the plaintiff
chose a particular forum not because it was convenient, but to take ad-
vantage of favorable law. 123 Thus, when American or foreign plaintiffs
sue alien defendants in United States courts, they cannot rest assured
that their forum choice will be honored simply because it is apparent that
to dismiss will subject them to the less favorable substantive law of an-
other country. In this way, the alien defendant is protected from a po-
tentially unfair advantage being given to the plaintiff.'
24
Second, Justice Marshall acknowledged that although a strong pre-
119. Piper was decided by only seven justices. All seven agreed with the first portion of
Justice Marshall's opinion holding that dismissal was not barred by an unfavorable change in
the law. Three justices dissented from the remainder of the opinion applying the Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), standard because they felt it unnecessary to reach that
question.
120. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
121. Piper, 454 U.S. at 241.
122. Id. at 249.
123. Id. at 249 n.15.
124. The plaintiff's interests are protected by the Court's recognition that a dismissal
would not be in the interests of justice if the "remedy provided by the alternative forum is so
clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all." Id. at 254. Under those
circumstances, there effectively is no alternative forum. The presumption, however, is that the
foreign courts are fair. See Note, Forum Non Conveniens and American Plaintiffs in the Fed-
eral Courts, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 373, 385-86 (1980). Mere differences in procedure do not
overcome that presumption. E.g., Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224, 226 (1st Cir. 1983);
ACLI Int'l Commodity Servs., Inc. v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 652 F. Supp. 1289, 1295-96
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Shields v. Mi Ryung Constr. Co., 508 F. Supp. 891, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 500 F. Supp. 787, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 650
F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1981). And the fact of smaller awards or the unavailability of certain theo-
ries of recovery does not establish that there is "no remedy at all." Piper, 454 U.S. at 254-55.
Typically, a finding that no viable alternative forum exists requires a showing of a complete
failure of procedure or remedy. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); Lake v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 262, 267-70 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Phoenix
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sumption normally favors plaintiff's forum choice, that presumption has
less force when the plaintiff is an alien, because it is less reasonable to
assume that the forum was chosen because of convenience.1 25 In a case
such as Asahi, then, had the trial court confronted a forum non motion
when suit first was filed, the presence of the American plaintiff would
invoke the presumption against dismissal. 2 6 But if the issue were ad-
dressed when only the cross-claiming alien defendants remained, less def-
erence need be given to the plaintiff's choice of a California forum.
The third portion of Justice Marshall's opinion outlined how both
the private and public interest factors supported dismissal. Of particular
interest is the Court's acknowledgement that the district court correctly
took into account the difficulty for the defendants resulting from their
inability to implead potential alien third party defendants and that the
limited review allowed the appellate court did not permit reversal.'
2 7
Further, the Court noted that the need to apply foreign law to the claims
was a legitimate public interest factor pointing toward dismissal.1
2 8
Applying the Piper criteria to the Asahi facts clearly supports dis-
missal of the cross-claim for forum non conveniens. At the point at which
the Asahi Court considered dismissal, only alien parties remained, invok-
ing no presumption for the California forum and requiring the applica-
tion of foreign law to the indemnity claim. 129 A more difficult question is
Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 455 (D. Del. 1978); Flota Maritima Browning
de Cuba, S.A. v. Ciudad de la Habana, 181 F. Supp. 301, 311 (D. Md. 1960).
125. Piper, 454 U.S. at 255.
126. This assumes that the forum non motion was addressed to the entire case. If dismis-
sal had been sought only as to the cross-claim, a closer question is presented. See infra text
accompanying notes 130-34.
One commentator has argued that the American citizenship of the plaintiff can establish a
presumption of convenience only if citizenship correlates with residency. See Note, supra note
124, at 381.
127. Piper, 454 U.S. at 259-60.
128. Id. at 260.
129. Numerous courts have ruled that aforum non dismissal is warranted because of clear
inconvenience when both parties are aliens, witnesses are outside the court's compulsory
power, foreign law governs, and the underlying transaction has little connection with the fo-
rum. E.g., Villar v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 782 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986); Sigala v.
Lido Maritime, Inc., 776 F.2d 1512 (11 th Cir. 1985); Gahr Dev., Inc. of Panama v. Nedlloyd
Lijnen, B.V., 723 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1984); Perez Y. Compania (Cataluna), S.A. v.
Triton Pac. Maritime Corp., 647 F. Supp. 556, 559 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Banco Metropolitano v.
Desarrollo de Autopistas Y Carreteras de Guatemala, S.A., 616 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Castillo v. Shipping Corp. of India, 606 F. Supp. 497, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Armadora Naval
Dominicana, S.A. v. Garcia, 478 So. 2d 873, 876 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Islamic Republic
of Iran v. Pahlavi, 94 A.D.2d 374, 376-77, 464 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489-90 (App. Div. 1983). See
generally Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited: A Decade of Development of the Doc-
trine of Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation in the Federal Courts, 17 VA. J.
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whether dismissal of the cross-claim would have been appropriate if the
American plaintiff remained in the case.
The policy underlying the device of impleader or cross-claims is to
encourage defendants to bring in others who may have a duty to indem-
nify or contribute to the payment of any claims proven by the plaintiff.
In this way not only is judicial economy achieved by avoiding multiple
suits (a policy somewhat inapposite if we acknowledge that the alterna-
tive forum is a foreign tribunal), but also the original defendant is pro-
tected from the delay and need of dual litigation. 130 The importance of
this policy in assuring fairness to the defendant was underscored in Piper
itself. 131 Thus, in answer to our more difficult question, the convenience
of the Taiwanese defendant clearly would be served by retaining its cross-
claim against Asahi, and the presumption against dismissal usually oper-
ating in forum non determinations seems rightly applicable,13 2 despite the
alien character of the claimant.
The issue then becomes whether that presumption is overcome by
those public interest factors indicating that the preferred forum is a for-
eign tribunal-namely, that the governing law will be foreign, and that
the transaction to which it is applied (the contract between the parties)
was entered into outside the United States so that there is little American
interest, but high foreign state interest in the dispute. The balancing of
these competing interests presents a close question and, realistically, that
means that the trial judge's determination most likely will be final be-
cause it is unlikely that it will be reversed as an abuse of discretion.
33 It
also suggests that in such cases the trial judge might be wise to postpone
ruling on theforum non motion until it becomes clear whether the Amer-
ican plaintiff will remain in the suit 34 or, as in Asahi, will settle, leaving
only the "foreign" claim. Depending on the stage of the litigation when
this occurs and the investment already made in preparing to litigate the
INT'L L. 755, 764-77 (1977); Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad, 20 STAN. L. REv. 57, 59-67
(1967).
130. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1442
(1971).
131. Piper, 454 U.S. at 259-60.
132. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 9, 1982, 821
F.2d 1147, 1168 (5th Cir. 1987); Excel Shipping Corp. v. Seatrain Int'l S.A., 584 F. Supp. 734,
741-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Compare Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 183,
227 Cal. Rptr. 247, 257 (1986) ("[I]t is inappropriate to shift the forum based upon the fact
that respondent may join others when it has not taken any steps to do so.").
133. See, e.g., Jones v. Searle Labs., 93 Ill. 2d 366, 373, 444 N.E.2d 157, 160 (1982) (forum
non dismissal upheld). See generally Note, supra note 129, at 782-90.
134. Whether the court can postpone such a determination may be open to question. See
infra text accompanying notes 155-64.
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cross-claim, the forum non considerations, as elaborated in Piper, would
dictate a reasonably clear result.
It also must be borne in mind that the court, when assessing the
fairness of the alternative forum and the hardship that may be imposed
on the plaintiff if suit proceeds there, has the power to condition its dis-
missal so as to avoid some of the potential burdens that otherwise might
exist. This flexibility is unique to forum non and is an additional factor
supporting the preference for this device over using a jurisdictional deter-
mination to assess convenience and fairness.
The Piper Court recognized that procedural differences between for-
eign tribunals and American courts often make the American judicial
system more attractive. Specifically, it pointed to differences in substan-
tive law, the ability of plaintiffs in American courts to shop for favorable
choice of law rules, the American jury trial system, the American rule
allowing contingent attorney fees and resisting fee-shifting to the losing
party and, finally, the more extensive discovery usually available in
American courts. 135 Although the Court found that those differences
were insufficient to establish that dismissal would be unfair, it later noted
that unfairness might be tempered by the ability to condition dismissal to
adjust the inequities. 136
The most common conditions stipulated on forum non dismissals
are that the defendant agrees to waive any objections to jurisdiction and
the statute of limitations in the foreign court. 137 But Piper suggested
other conditions, such as requiring the defendant to agree to produce
records relevant to the plaintiff's claims that would not be available
under the more restrictive discovery regime of the foreign court. 138
The power to impose conditions is not unlimited. It must be care-
fully exercised to avoid creating an unfair preference for the plaintiffs.
Further, the object is not to impose American notions of procedure on
foreign litigation. Identical procedure is not necessary to create a fair
forum. 139 Thus, although several courts have conditioned dismissal on
135. Piper, 454 U.S. at 252 n.18.
136. Id. at 257 n.25.
137. E.g., Ahmed v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224, 225 (1st Cir. 1983); Needham v. Phillips
Petroleum Co. of Norway, 719 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1983); Pain v. United Technologies
Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784-85 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Fitzgerald v.
Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 452 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976); Shields v.
Mi Ryung Constr. Co., 508 F. Supp. 891, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Gordinsky v. Fairchild Indus.,
Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1245, 1251 (D. Md. 1981); Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp. v. Fiat,
S.P.A., 84 F.R.D. 299, 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); Bewers v. American Home Prods. Corp., 99
A.D.2d 949, 949, 472 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (App. Div. 1st 1984).
138. Piper, 454 U.S. at 257 n.25.
139. See cases cited supra note 124.
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the defendant's agreement to make necessary documents or witnesses
available in the foreign tribunal, 140 the Second Circuit recently reversed a
district court order that conditioned dismissal on the defendants' agree-
ment to be bound by American discovery rules in an Indian tribunal,
even though discovery from the plaintiffs was to be governed by more
restrictive Indian law.Y" As the court noted:
We recognize that under some circumstances, such as when a moving
defendant unconditionally consents thereto or no undiscovered evi-
dence of consequence is believed to be under the control of a plaintiff
or co-defendant, it may be appropriate to condition a forum non con-
veniens dismissal on the moving defendant's submission to discovery
under the Federal Rules without requiring reciprocal discovery by it of
the plaintiff. . . . Basic justice dictates that both sides be treated
equally, with each having equal access to the evidence in the possession
or under the control of the other.142
Thus, the trial court was limited to conditioning dismissal on the rights
of both sides to utilize Federal Rules discovery, if allowed by the Indian
authorities, or to remitting both sides to the Indian discovery system.
As the preceding discussion should have made clear, the adoption of
a two-step jurisdiction-forum non approach in cases like Asahi or
Helicopteros would have little impact on the outcome, but would provide
a much better methodology for handling those cases. The factors the
Court discussed in Asahi 143 as pertinent to a fairness inquiry for jurisdic-
tion purposes embrace most of the same things relevant to forum non
and, consequently, the same conclusions as to fairness or unfairness
would be likely. 44 Under our model, however, it would not be necessary
140. E.g., Shields, 508 F. Supp. at 897; Harrison v. Wyeth Labs. Div. of Am. Home Prods.
Corp., 510 F. Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd mem., 676 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1982); Fosen v.
United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 503 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 203 (2d
Cir. 1980); see also Fitzpatrick, "Reyno": Its Progeny and Its Effects on Aviation Litigation, 48
J. AIR L. & COM. 539, 542 (1983).
141. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984,
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
142. Id. at 205 (citations omitted).
143. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
144. Professor Weinberg has argued that a foreign tribunal always will present serious
disadvantages to an American plaintiff so that it would be "unthinkable" that such a case
could be dismissed forforum non if jurisdiction were proper. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 934.
Apparently, not all courts agree. See, e.g., J. F. Pritchard & Co. v. Dow Chem. of Canada,
Ltd., 462 F.2d 998, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 1972); ACLI Int'l Commodity Servs., Inc. v. Banque
Populaire Suisse, 652 F. Supp. 1289, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Munsell v. La Basserie Molson Du
Quebec Limitee, 623 F. Supp. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Shepard Niles Crane & Hoist Corp.
v. Fiat, S.P.A., 84 F.R.D. 299, 306 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). Furthermore, at least part of Professor
Weinberg's conclusion is premised on the fact that a fairness determination already has been
made for jurisdiction purposes, suggesting the need to demonstrate greater unfairness to over-
come that ruling. This problem would not occur under our model becauseforum non would
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to worry about how to balance those concerns against the defendant's
contacts with the forum, providing important clarification as to what ac-
tually is at issue. Further, the recognition that fairness properly is part of
the forum non determination also makes clear that a discretionary deci-
sion is involved, making it subject to narrower review.' 45 This result
seems more in keeping with the realities of what is at issue-a careful
balancing of potentially competing private and public interests. Our
model approach also would not be likely to affect the result in
Helicopteros. In that case, it should be remembered, the Court rested its
conclusion not on fairness or convenience, but on the notion that the
contacts were insufficient to support jurisdiction. 146 Consequently, un-
less we assume that there were additional national contacts such that
general jurisdiction could have been asserted, the forum non conveniens
determination never would be reached. 147
There are, however, two potential difficulties inherent in relying on
forum non to protect fairness that should be addressed. The first is the
question whether, given the need for uniform treatment and predictabil-
ity, state courts should be allowed to apply their own notions of the doc-
trine in determining whether to dismiss. This question has important
ramifications. For example, some states adhere to the practice that forum
non dismissals cannot be granted whenever a resident plaintiff is in-
volved;1 48 the Piper standard does not set forth any automatic rules of
thumb, and if all other factors suggest that the foreign tribunal would be
the preferred one, then Piper would suggest that dismissal should follow.
Even more directly, California courts have ruled that the California stan-
dard for considering the impact of a change in the law is much more
liberal than the Piper standard and that an alien plaintiff's choice of a
involve the only fairness inquiry. As to the weight to be given to the American citizenship of
the plaintiff in that inquiry, see supra text accompanying note 126.
145. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 257.
146. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
147. There is some question on reading Helicopteros whether the Court considered each of
the four contacts in isolation or whether it aggregated the four and still found the sum total to
be insufficient. If the former is the case, then adoption of our approach could change the result
because aggregate contacts would be used and could substantiate jurisdiction. At that point
the question of forum non would become important. Given the witnesses and evidence and the
fact that Peruvian law most likely would be applied, dismissal might be appropriate. The
major argument against it is that Helicol was only a codefendant, while the others were Texan
and American companies. However, if Peru provided a viable alternative forum for all the
defendants, then that objection also could be overcome.
148. E.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Swain, 362 So. 2d 17. 18 (Fla. 1978); Archibald v.
Cinerama Hotels, 15 Cal. 3d 853, 858, 544 P.2d 947, 950, 126 Cal. Rptr. 811, 814 (1976),
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Lohn, 192 Colo. 200, 201, 557 P.2d 373, 374 (1971).
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California forum is entitled to substantial deference. 149
Historically, when the Supreme Court has set forthforum non prin-
ciples it has been for the federal courts alone, and state courts have been
free to accept or reject them. 150 Nonetheless, a strong argument can be
made that the state tribunal, sitting as a national court in a suit against
an alien, should be governed by federal principles suggesting when in the
exercise of its discretion it should decline jurisdiction. The need for the
dominance of federal standards in the international context is quite com-
pelling.15' The power to assert jurisdiction on a nationwide basis must be
constrained by principles derived from national interests or concerns. As
a practical matter, forum non decisions in these international cases serve
as a curb on jurisdictional assertions that might have foreign relations
implications.1
52
Although the above answer seems quite clear, a secondary gov-
erning law issue also lurks, and is not as easily answered. It arises be-
cause of procedural differences between many states and the federal
courts concerning how and when to raise preliminary issues, such as fo-
rum non conveniens. In most systems, issues going to defendant's con-
venience must be raised at the outset of the litigation or they are
waived.1 53 Additionally, in some states governed by strict procedural
codes, the defendant would not be able to join the two preliminary ques-
tions whether jurisdiction was proper and whether, even if it was, forum
non concerns suggest that the court should dismiss. To do so would be
deemed making a general appearance and constitute a waiver of the juris-
diction objection. 154 Since under our model, the forum non inquiry effec-
149. Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 170-71, 227 Cal. Rptr. 247,
252 (1986); Holmes v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 380-82, 202 Cal. Rptr. 773,
779 (1984).
150. It generally is agreed that federal diversity courts need not be bound by stateforum
non rules as they involve primarily matters of court administration. See In re Air Crash Disas-
ter Near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir. 1987); 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION
2D § 3828, at 293-95 (1986). The Supreme Court, however, never has decided whether federal
forum non principles may be applied in a diversity case or are restricted to federal question
cases. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 248 n.13. The adoption of federal forum non principles in suits
against aliens necessarily would apply in diversity cases, as well as provide a rule applicable in
the state courts.
151. For an excellent exposition of the need for and propriety of a federal standard, see
Greenberg, The Appropriate Source of Law for Forum Non Conveniens Decisions in Interna-
tional Cases: A Proposal for the Development of Federal Common Law, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus.
LAW. 155 (1986).
152. See Stein, supra note 58, at 739 n.220.
153. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 95, at 84-85.
154. See id. § 3.26.
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tively substitutes for the consideration of fairness factors that are part of
the normal fourteenth amendment due process inquiry in other state
court jurisdiction cases, it is essential that these issues not be subjected to
a risk of forfeiture because of a procedural trap.
In a case like Asahi an additional wrinkle is presented. Remember
that at the time suit was filed an injured California plaintiff sued the
Taiwanese manufacturer who brought in Asahi on a cross-complaint.
Had the Japanese defendant moved initially to dismiss for forum non
(recognizing that under a national contacts approach coupled with a
stream of commerce theory, objections to jurisdiction would be futile),
the court could have refused to dismiss because at that point California
represented the best forum in which to litigate the matter between all the
parties. 155 Certainly, given the California plaintiff and accident, the main
suit would not have been dismissed. Further, to allow the Taiwanese
defendant the ability to protect itself and avoid the delay of separate ac-
tions,156 it could be deemed appropriate (fair) to keep the Japanese de-
fendant in the California forum. Indeed, these very facts might suggest
to the attorneys for the Japanese defendant that a forum non motion
should not be filed because its chances of success would be so slim. The
inquiry, however, differs once the plaintiff has settled his claims and the
sole issue remaining involves the indemnity question. If the court has
not invested much time or energy in the action, all forum non factors
would suggest that dismissal would be appropriate. Yet, technically, the
defense no longer would be available because it was not raised at the
outset.
That result, which is to be abhorred, could be avoided if we adjusted
the procedural rules to recognize that forum non, although a waivable
defense, must be raised as soon as the facts realistically reveal that it is a
legitimate objection. 157 A defendant who raised it at the first available
opportunity would not be subject to the risk of waiver. This flexible ap-
proach would be in keeping with the fluid and discretionary character of
155. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34. For additional examples of cases in which
a motion forforum non was denied when an American plaintiff sued an alien defendant and
the alternative forum was foreign, see Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v. Tradewind Airways Ltd., 659
F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Teleco Oilfield Servs., Inc. v. Skandia Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp.
753, 759 (D. Conn. 1987); Intel Corp. v. Malaysian Airline Sys., 652 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
When an American plaintiff is suing a foreign government under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, the presumption favoring plaintiff's forum choice may be even greater. See
Kane, supra note 18, at 411-12.
156. See supra text accompanying note 130.
157. This appears to be the prevailing rule in the federal courts. See C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 150, § 3828, at 291.
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forum non itself.158 Indeed, a strong analogy can be drawn to transfer
motions in the federal court system that are limited only by considera-
tions of general timeliness, not strict procedural rules. 159
Such flexibility very well might be inconsistent with that utilized in
the forum state, and on matters so procedural the states generally have
had authority to follow their own law. 160 The only argument against this
conclusion would be the rather extreme one that as international matters
are federal, and the forfeiture of objections by alien defendants because of
procedural technicalities would create a poor image internationally, the
states in those cases should follow a federal approach that would be more
flexible. But that argument seems weak, at least in the absence of federal
legislation' 6' and against the long historical backdrop of state procedure
governing in state courts, so it probably would not prevail. 162 This
means that we simply have to accept the fact that in some cases, despite
all desires to provide a reasoned inquiry, the alien defendant in a state
court may not have a truly viable opportunity to have his fairness objec-
tions seriously considered. 163 But the fact that a few cases will have poor
results does not undercut the conclusion that the advantages of our ap-
proach far outweigh the disadvantages that might occur in those few
cases. 164 We must leave it to the state courts to recognize the importance
158. It is important to recognize that forum non is not simply a venue motion in the
international context. It acts much more like transfer motions in the federal courts, so that
there should not be a specific time barrier preventing its consideration.
159. See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 150, § 3844, at 334-37.
160. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 95, at 233-34.
161. There should be no doubt that if Congress passed specific legislation regulating such
matters, it would be binding on the states. See generally Note, Procedural Protection for Fed-
eral Rights in State Courts, 30 U. CIN. L. REv. 184 (1961).
162. In those cases in which state courts have been required to adhere to federal proce-
dure, the Supreme Court typically has been able to conclude that such a ruling would not be
too disruptive of or intrusive on the state court system. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342
U.S. 359, 361 (1952) (right to jury trial); Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296
(1949) (rule of construction for pleadings). If the imposition of a federal standard would be
disruptive and the state's procedure is nondiscriminatory, then federal law may not be applied.
See Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (unanimous verdict rule).
Although there obviously are arguments on both sides, our view is that to require state courts
as a matter of federal common law to ignore their own timing restraints, which are designed to
achieve early dispositions of preliminary issues and avoid wasted trials, would be inappropriate
without congressional authorization.
163. Perhaps this conclusion might be ameliorated if defendant raised forum non at the
outset so as to preserve the objection and then was able to renew the challenge after a change
in circumstances. Although this approach involves a potentially wasteful (perhaps even frivo-
lous?) initial forum non motion, it would be more consistent with those states that demand
early motions to avoid waiver.
164. The alien defendant also may not be completely at the mercy of the state procedural
system if it can remove the suit to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982).
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of developing special or flexible rules to accommodate the problem.
We conclude where we began. The question of whether a court may
exercise jurisdiction over an alien defendant should be determined as a
matter of power solely by inquiring into what, if any, contacts the de-
fendant has had with the nation as a whole. If such contacts exist, then
the issue of the fairness of exerting jurisdiction properly may be ad-
dressed under the discretionary standard of forum non con veniens, as just
elaborated. Additional due process concerns are present in the problem
of how to provide adequate notice. Thus, we now will turn to the notice
question to explore how it may be satisfied in the international setting.
II. Notice and Service of Process
Once it is determined that jurisdiction properly may be asserted over
an alien defendant, it is necessary to consider whether adequate notice of
the suit has been or can be given. A failure of notice means a failure of
due process and may subject the suit to dismissal,1 65 or, if judgment is
reached, may prevent the judgment from being enforced abroad. 166 The
traditional method of assuring notice is service of process.1 6 7 Recent de-
velopments within the United States have denigrated the functions once
accomplished by service168 and sometimes have equated notice with mere
knowledge. 169 Within the United States, so be it. But when process is
served outside our borders, and primarily upon non-Americans, the lib-
eration we enjoy at home has not yet arrived. Failure to meet technical
requirements can be fatal. Thus, questions of notice necessitate a serious
inquiry into whether the requirements for service have been followed, as
well as whether the notice given meets constitutional demands.
The due process requirements surrounding service can be stated
165. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
166. See infra text accompanying notes 231-32. Compare Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430
F. Supp. 1243, 1248 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980) (Canadian judgment
against California defendant will be enforced only if the defendant received actual notice and
an opportunity to defend).
167. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 95, § 3.20. In
cases based on attachment jurisdiction, attachment statutes, rather than service of process stat-
utes, control. For comparative purposes, an interesting survey of the prejudgment attachment
procedures of ten European countries is found in INT'L FIN. L. REV. 29 (Oct. 1983).
168. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIvIL 2D § 1074 (1987). Technical defects in service most often are cured by amendment,
unless the defendant claims a lack of notice as a result. See id. §§ 1131-32.
169. Consider Federal Rule 15(c), which allows relation back of an amendment to add a
party only when the party has had notice of the institution of the action. Notice may be
equated with mere knowledge, without any formal notice given on the part of the plaintiff.
E.g., Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1977); Tretter v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329, 331 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
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simply: The Constitution requires that service of process be reasonably
calculated to give defendant actual notice of the proceedings and an op-
portunity to be heard.170 This means that process must convey the nec-
essary information to allow the defendant to make an informed judgment
about what to do, as well as give adequate time to make an appearance.
As the Supreme Court noted in the seminal case of Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 171 "when notice is a person's due, process
which is a mere gesture is not due process."
' 172
We need not spend much time deliberating about the meaning of
this general standard when applied to alien defendants because the meth-
ods for serving process abroad are controlled by specific treaties, statutes,
and rules drafted with the constitutional standard in mind. Typically,
compliance with those provisions will assure that due process require-
ments are satisfied. 173 Major problems occur, however, in interpreting
some of the specific requirements, as well as in determining which provi-
sions apply in a particular case. A brief exploration, therefore, may be
helpful.
A lawyer researching how to accomplish service of process on an
alien outside the United States must consult several sources. The first
thing to note is that in 1969 the United States ratified the Hague Conven-
tion on the Service Abroad of Judicial Documents in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters.174 As of 1985, twenty-eight countries were parties to that
Convention,1 75 so that if the defendant resides in one of those countries,
170. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
171. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
172. Id. at 315.
173. One question that does arise is whether notice must be in the defendant's native lan-
guage in order to satisfy due process. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. The
lower courts, however, appear to reject that conclusion. See Taban v. Hodgeson, 662 F.2d
862, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Israeli default judgment upheld against U.S. defendant served in
Jerusalem with papers drawn in Hebrew). As long as service is made in the language of the
jurisdiction where the defendant is served, there can be no valid constitutional objection. See
Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 814, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05 (1973) (service in United
States in English on Spanish defendant upheld), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1987); Julen v.
Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 328, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798 (1972) (service on United States
defendant of Swiss process written in German held ineffective because, "[w]hile we do not
require documents in a foreign language to be translated into English in order to be validly
served, we think that at a minimum a defendant should be informed in the language of the
jurisdiction in which he is served.., that a legal action of a specific nature is pending against
him at a particular time and place").
174. Opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S.
163 (entered into force Feb. 10, 1969) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Hague Conven-
tion applies to the transmission of all types of judicial documents. Id. art. 1. Of concern here
are solely questions regarding service of process.
175. The text of the Hague Convention and a list of signatory countries and their dates of
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service may proceed under it. 176 Other methods for serving alien defend-
ants may be found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) applicable in
the federal courts, in various state service provisions, and in special state
and federal statutes that specify a particular method of service in certain
cases. 1
7 7
Each of these methods includes several alternative means of effectu-
ating service, and the viability of using any particular one must be as-
sessed in light of the foreign country's acceptance of its propriety. This
latter restraint exists for two very practical reasons. First, in some coun-
tries service of process is viewed as a sovereign act so that any attempt to
do so may be deemed a violation of that state's sovereignty and subject to
sanction. 178 Second, the use of a service method that is not accepted in
the foreign country will mean that any American judgment that is forth-
coming may not be enforced in that country, 179 making the judgment
useless unless the defendant has assets in the United States that may be
seized. 180 So, careful consideration of the various requirements is
ratification can be found in 28 U.S.C. appended to FED. R. Civ. P. 4. See also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 8, ch. 7, introductory note at 697.
176. Whether the Hague Convention provides the exclusive means of service is discussed
infra text accompanying notes 217-24.
177. For example, in suits against foreign governments or instrumentalities, special service
provisions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1982). See
generally George, A Practical and Theoretical Analysis of Service of Process under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 INT'L LAW. 49 (1985). These service methods are exclusive. See
Lippus v. Dahlgren Mfg. Co., 644 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Kane, supra note 18,
at 397-402; Note, Service of Process Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: The
Argumentsfor Exclusivity, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 357 (1981). Technical noncompliance with
the statutory requirements will not result in a failure of jurisdiction as long as actual notice has
been received. See Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1352
(11th Cir. 1982); Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 821 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dis-
missed, 455 U.S. 929 (1982); Obenchain Corp. v. Corporation Nacionale de Inversiones, 656 F.
Supp. 435, 437 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Banco Metropolitano v. Desarrollo de Autopistas, 616 F.
Supp. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see Magnus Elec., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 620 F.
Supp. 387, 389 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Unidyne Corp. v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 590 F. Supp. 398,
401-02 (S.D. Va. 1984); Gray v. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of the Congo to
the United Nations, 443 F. Supp. 816, 820-21 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.
1978).
178. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 165, § 1133, at 367; Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, Memorandum, Nov. 6, 1980, at 10, reprinted in B. RISTAU, IN-
TERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) (1984) ("service of judicial
documents is regarded in civil law countries as performance of a judicial function, and the laws
of some countries (e.g., Austria, Japan, Switzerland, Yugoslavia) make it an offense for foreign
officials to perform, without express permission from the local sovereign, judicial functions
within their territories").
179. See Miller, International Cooperation in Litigation Between the United States and
Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Accommodation in a Test Tube, 49 MINN. L. REV. 1069,
1086 (1965).
180. Absent a treaty obligation, process that comports with American law but violates the
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essential.
The Hague Convention was drafted to accomplish three objec-
tives.181 First, the drafters wanted to simplify the methods of serving in
the territory of one state documents issued by the courts of another. Sec-
ond, they desired to establish a system for service that best would ensure
that the person served received actual notice in time to respond to pend-
ing litigation. Third, they created a means by which proof of service
abroad easily could be made. To effectuate these goals, they developed a
basic system for service, yet allowed for the use of several alternative
methods, as long as the state in which service is made does not object to
the particular method utilized. It is important to keep in mind that the
Convention does not itself authorize service abroad. It merely provides
methods of service that may be used if the plaintiff can invoke some other
authority-a state or federal long-arm statute-allowing for service
outside the forum's borders.
1 82
The unique contribution of the Convention is its creation of a "Cen-
tral Authority" in each signatory state that is responsible for executing
requests from abroad for service of judicial documents. 183 The person
serving process in the sending state must send to the Central Authority
of the receiving state two copies of a "request," which conform to the
model annexed to the Convention, as well as the original and a copy of
the documents to be served.184 If the request does not comply with the
requirements, the Central Authority will inform the sender of its objec-
tions and will not complete service until the defects are remedied. 185 If
law of the receiving state will not invalidate the judgment insofar as it is to be enforced in the
United States. See ALCO Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 26-27 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Atlantic Steamers Supply Co. v. International Maritime Supplies Co., 268 F. Supp. 1009, 1015
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); REsTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 482, reporter's note 2; Kaplan, Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (I), 77 HARV. L. REV. 601, 637 (1964).
181. See 1 B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMER-
CIAL) § 14-1, at 118-19 (1984).
182. See DeJames v. Magnificance Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir.), cerL
denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981). The failure to understand that the requirements of both a long-
arm statute and the Hague Convention must be met can lead to erroneous decisions. E.g., A.J.
McNulty & Co. v. Rocamat, 132 Misc. 2d 1064, 1066, 506 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 (1986) (holding
that the Hague Convention only applies to defendants with no contacts with the state; when
sufficient contacts exist, service under state law is permissible).
183. Hague Convention, supra note 174, art. 2. In the United States, the Central Author-
ity is the Department of Justice. The Department does not facilitate service of American pro-
cess abroad; American litigants must deliver their documents directly to the foreign Central
Authority.
184. Id. art. 3.
185. Id. art. 4; see, e.g., Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 769 (Ala. 1983) (German
Central Authority rejected because plaintiff failed to send the proper request form and failed to
send copies written in German and English).
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the request is in compliance, the Authority will arrange to have service
accomplished by a method consistent with that country's internal law, or
by a method requested, if that method comports with the internal law.'
86
Once service is effected, the Authority returns a certificate to the sender
stating that service has been accomplished, the method used to do so, the
date it was completed, and the person to whom process was delivered. 187
An important provision of the Hague Convention makes clear that
use of the Central Authority is not the exclusive means of effecting ser-
vice under the treaty, unless the receiving state has objected to the alter-
native methods. 188 Specifically mentioned as alternatives are the freedom
to send judicial documents by postal channels directly to the person to be
served;1 89 the freedom to use "judicial officers, officials or other compe-
tent persons" of the sending state to effect service directly through com-
parable authorities of the receiving state;190 and the freedom of any
person interested in the litigation to effect service through the judicial
officers, officials, or competent persons of the receiving state.' 9'
Although these other means may be feasible in many cases, several signa-
tory states have objected to one or more of them, 92 so that an American
lawyer attempting to serve process under the Convention must read care-
fully the objections filed by the receiving state. In addition, some
problems of interpretation exist, 193 further complicating service. For ex-
ample, some courts have held that "send" does not mean "serve" so that
186. Hague Convention, supra note 174, art. 5.
187. Id. art. 6; see, e.g., Gould Entertainment Corp. v. Bodo, 107 F.R.D. 308, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
188. Hague Convention, supra note 174, art. 10.
189. Id. art. 10(a); see, e.g., Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 1082,
1085 (E.D. Va. 1984); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182, 1206
(D.D.C. 1984).
190. Hague Convention, supra note 174, art. 10(b). The best example of this method is
letters rogatory. See infra text accompanying notes 205-07. There is some ambiguity in article
10(b) in that the text does not make clear who are "competent persons" of the State of origin
or destination. This could cause problems because under American law an attorney or any
private person over the age of 18 is "competent" to deliver service of process. Under the laws
of most civil law jurisdictions, however, only governmental officials of the State are "compe-
tent" to effect service. See B. RISTAU, supra note 181, § 4-26, at 167-68.
191. Hague Convention, supra note 174, art. 10(c); see also supra note 189.
192. See, e.g., Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (Japan objects to personal service, but not delivery through mail); Harris v. Browning-
Ferris Indus. Chem. Servs., Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777 (M.D. La. 1984) (Germany objects to
mail service); Porsche, A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 761, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155,
158 (1981) (Germany objects to mail service); Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 135-36, 608
P.2d 68, 72-73 (Ct. App. 1980) (Japan objects to personal service).
193. See generally Note, The Effect of the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125
(1969).
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service cannot be accomplished through the mails, even if the receiving
state has not objected, 194 although the weight of authority now appears
to reject that interpretation.
195
Finally, the Hague Convention requires the documents sent to be
written either in French or English, unless the receiving state has re-
quested that documents served by the Central Authority be translated
into its official language. 196 Some countries have done so, so that to serve
process by means of their Central Authority requires that all documents
be translated into the official language. 197 If service, however, is by a
"particular method requested," or if the defendant accepts service volun-
tarily, the documents do not have to be translated. 198
In addition to the Hague Convention, -provisions governing service
of process on an alien defendant residing abroad may be found in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as in some state statutes. In the
federal courts, the methods for serving process abroad typically are gov-
erned by Federal Rule 4(). Similar state service statutes may be used in
state courts. These provisions are particularly critical when serving pro-
cess in non-Convention countries, because they control in the absence of
a specific state or federal statute designed for particular litigation. A
brief description of how they operate will illustrate some of their special
problems and features.
Federal Rule 4(i) was added to the Rules in the 1960s as part of a
flurry of procedural reform that led to the signing of the Hague Conven-
tion. 199 The rule was drafted to be flexible enough to allow an American
plaintiff to effect service that would be legal under domestic law as well
as conform to foreign law; and thus it set out five possible methods of
194. See Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 466-67 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Reyn-
olds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97, 99-100,490 N.Y.S.2d 295, 297-98 (App. Div. 1984); Ordmandy v.
Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954, 955, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274, 274-75 (1984).
195. See Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1986); Newport Components,
Inc. v. NEC Home Electronics (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1541-42 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 109 A.D.2d 94, 96, 515 N.Y.S.2d 352, 355 (App. Div. 1987);
Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 820-21, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 411
(1973).
196. Hague Convention, supra note 174, arts. 7, 5.
197. Hague Convention, supra note 174, Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany;
see Teknekron Management, Inc. v. Quante Fernmeldetechnik, GmbH, 115 F.R.D. 175, 177
(D. Nev. 1987) (service on West German quashed because Germany requires translation and a
large exhibit attached to the complaint was only in English).
198. See Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 597 F. Supp. 1082, 1086 (E.D. Va.
1984); B. RiSTAU, supra note 181, at 150.
199. See Kaplan, supra note 180, at 635-39; Smit, International Litigation Under the
United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1016 n.8 (1965).
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service,200 reflecting the diversity of foreign procedural rules.
201
The first method merely permits service to be made in conformity
with the law of the foreign country in which service is to be effected.
202
Necessarily, this approach assures that the receiving state can have no
objections to the means of transmitting notice.20 3 When the law of that
state is too difficult to ascertain or prohibitively restrictive,204 then the
other methods of rule 4(i) offer useful alternatives.
The second method authorizes service to be made as directed by a
foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory; 20 5 that is, in response to
a "request for judicial assistance addressed by a court of one state to a
court or other competent authority of another state.' 20 6 This procedure
is slow and can be expensive as well as confusing.207 Nonetheless, if pro-
cess is served in a country like Switzerland, which regards service as a
sovereign act to be done only by government officials, it may provide the
only means of assuring the enforceability of the judgment abroad, as well
as avoiding offense to the foreign government.
20 8
Personal service by the plaintiff is the third method authorized
under the rule,209 and service by mail is permitted under rule 4(i)(D) as
long as a signed receipt is obtained. The sole restraint on this power is
that the method utilized must comport with American due process re-
200. In 1984, an amendment was proposed to add reference to two additional service
methods: that accomplished pursuant to a treaty or convention, and by diplomatic or consular
officers when authorized by the Department of State. The amendment has not been approved
yet. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 168, § 1134, at 379-80.
201. See generally id. § 1134. Like the Hague Convention, rule 4(i) speaks only to the
manner of service and not to whether extraterritorial service is permissible. See Martens v.
Winder, 341 F.2d 197, 199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 937 (1965).
202. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(i)(A).
203. When service is accomplished under foreign law, the rule also provides that it must be
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, thereby assuring that American due process no-
tions are honored even if not required in the foreign state.
204. Foreign service laws tend to be more restrictive and inhibiting than American rules.
See Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62
YALE L.J. 515, 536-38 (1953).
205. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(i)(B).
206. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 471, reporter's note 1.
207. See id.; Jones, supra note 204, at 530 nn.42 & 43. In the United States, the procedure
surrounding letters rogatory for signatory states is governed by the Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 12140. For nonsignatory states, the procedure is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1781
(1982).
208. For a description of how letters rogatory operate in Switzerland, see Miller, supra
note 179, at 1079-84.
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(C).
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quirements.2 10 Although these methods may seem the easiest and most
familiar to American litigants and lawyers, they are subject to strenuous
objections by some foreign states. For example, Switzerland and the So-
viet Union view service by mail as a violation not only of their internal
law, but of customary international law as well. 211 Finally, if none of the
first four methods seem satisfactory, the fifth alternative allows the court
to fashion a method of service according to the needs of a particular
litigant in a particular case.
212
Before leaving this description of the various methods that have
been authorized for serving process abroad, some reference to state law
must be made. Although the bulk of transnational litigation probably
occurs in the federal courts, litigation against alien defendants does arise
in the state courts, as evidenced by the Helicopteros and Asahi cases.
213
Many state service provisions do not contain any explicit treatment of
methods of serving process abroad.214 A uniform act proposed during
the 1960s was adopted by a few states.215 More recently, some states
have enacted specific statutes governing how to serve process abroad.
216
In general these provisions are similar to Federal Rule 4(i), designed to
permit maximum flexibility for cases in which the vagaries of foreign law
should be considered. Thus, they will not be treated separately here,
other than to note that litigants should check their local authorities to
determine whether applicable state provisions may be utilized.
The preceding description of the various provisions setting out ser-
vice methods outside the United States illustrates the wide range of
210. See, ag., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 176 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
211. See B. RiSTAU, supra note 181, § 4-28, at 165.
212. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(E). Given the wide range of methods available under the rule,
this catch-all provision seldom is utilized. See, e.g., Vesco, 593 F.2d at 176 n.8 (associate of
plaintiff's law firm appointed to serve); Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 248 F. Supp. 537, 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (service by ordinary mail to defendant at residence; to defendant's Canadian
attorneys at their offices; and to Indiana attorney who was retained by defendant in connection
with subject matter of suit).
213. The federal courts also are authorized to make use of state service statutes. FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(e).
214. Some states merely provide that whenever service is to be accomplished outside their
borders, it should be made "in the same manner as service is made within the state." E.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.194 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 313 (McKinney
1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 1 16 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
215. See Uniform Interstate and Int'l Procedure Act § 2.01, reproduced with commentary
in 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 415, 422-24 (1962). Only four states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands have enacted the Uniform Act. See B. RIsTAU, supra note 181, §§ 3-4, at 60 &
n.2.
216. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 413.10 (West Supp. 1984); MASS. R. Civ. P. 4(e)
(West 1978).
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choices that may confront plaintiff's counsel. In practice, however, not
all these devices may be available. In particular, serious questions have
been raised concerning whether service made on a defendant residing in a
country that is a signatory to the Hague Convention must be in compli-
ance with the Convention or whether the treaty merely supplements the
methods listed in Federal Rule 4(i) or comparable state service provi-
sions. Although language in some early cases suggested that the Conven-
tion was meant only to be supplementary to other service methods, 217 the
preponderance of both state and federal authority now recognize that the
Convention sets out the exclusive means by which service can be accom-
plished in signatory states.218 Further, the fact that the defendant actu-
ally received notice of the suit will not cure a failure to comply with the
requirements of the Convention.219
The conclusion that the Convention's service methods are exclusive
seems unassailable. 220 In addition, it does not work any undue hardship
217. See Vesco, 593 F.2d at 179-80; Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 431 F.
Supp. 1226, 1229 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905
(1978); Shoei Kako v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 821-22, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 411-12
(1973); see also Comment, An Interpretation of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents Concerning Personal Service in Japan, 6 Lov. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 143, 152-53 (1983).
218. See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1986); A.I.M. Int'l, Inc.,
v. Battenfeld Extrusions Sys., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 633, 638-39 (M.D. Ga. 1987); Harris v. Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus. Chem. Servs., Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777-78 (M.D. La. 1984); Richardson v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73, 78-79 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Cipolla v. Picard Porsche
Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130, 132 (R.I. 1985); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 769 (Ala.
1983); Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G., 449 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (App. Div. 1982);
Porsche A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 760, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155, 158 (1981);
Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 136, 608 P.2d 68, 73 (Ct. App. 1980). But cf Schlunk v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 145 Il. App. 3d 594, 495 N.E.2d 1114 (1986) (when ser-
vice on foreign corporation can be made on wholly owned subsidiary in the United States,
Hague Convention does not apply), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987).
The Supreme Court implicitly approved the exclusivity of service under the Convention
when it ruled that a later evidence convention was not exclusive, pointing to its failure to use
the mandatory language in the Hague Service Convention. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aer-
ospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for So. Dist. of Iowa, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
219. See, e.g., Porsche A.G., 123 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 159; Kadota, 125
Ariz. at 137, 608 P.2d at 74. But cf Fox v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 103 F.R.D.
453, 455 (W.D. Tenn. 1984) (service through French Central Authority upheld even though
proof of service form required under Convention defective). The court erroneously suggested
that the Convention was complimentary to Federal Rule 4, and thus, following practice under
that provision, technical defects could be ignored when notice clearly had been given. The
result reached, however, seems correct because, as the court later noted, there was nothing in
the Convention suggesting that it was inappropriate to exercise judicial discretion to overlook
the type of defect that occurred "where no injustice or prejudice is likely to result to the party
located abroad, or to the interests of the affected signatory country." Id.
220. The conclusion that the Hague Convention's methods must be followed unless the
domestic law of the receiving State has more liberal provisions is reinforced by the terms of
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on a plaintiff who was unaware of the existence of the Convention when
trying to serve because the remedy for improper service is not to dismiss
the action, but merely to quash service and allow plaintiff the opportu-
nity to follow the Convention's procedures. 221 As a treaty, the Conven-
tion is "the supreme Law of the Land, ' 222 and should supersede any
conflicting state laws. Further, it is a self-executing treaty,223 having the
same status in American domestic law as a federal statute. As the most
recent "statute," its dominance over Federal Rule 4(i) should be clear.
224
The American Delegation to the Hague Conference conceded that the
Convention might require some modifications in the practice of some
states and would provide greater protection to the defendant who lives
outside the United States in a Convention country than within the
United States itself.225 They concluded, however, that "[m]inor modifi-
cations in domestic procedure relating to defendants in convention coun-
tries are well worth the benefits which will flow to U.S. defendants who
may become involved in litigation abroad.
'226
article 15 of the Convention, forbidding default judgments unless it is established that the
defendant was served in a foreign country in sufficient time to permit defending the action in
the forum, and that the defendant was served by a method prescribed either by the internal law
of the state where service was made or by the Convention. See also Bishop, International
Litigation in Texas: Service of Process and Jurisdiction, 35 Sw. L.J. 1013, 1031-38 (1982).
221. E.g., Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Harris v.
Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Servs., Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775, 778 (M.D. La. 1984); Cipolla, 496
A.2d at 132.
In some cases neither the parties nor the court appear aware of the Convention and ser-
vice has been upheld under Federal Rule 4(i) or state law, with no reference to whether it met
the treaty's standards. E.g., Atlantic Lines, Ltd. v. M/V Domburgh, 473 F. Supp. 700, 704
(S.D. Fla. 1979); Smokey's of Tulsa, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 453 F. Supp. 1265,
1267 (E.D. Okla. 1978); Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co., 453 F. Supp. 385, 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 329-30 (E.D. Pa.
1975). Although it is most likely that ignorance of the treaty on the part of all produced these
results, one way of viewing these cases is that defendants failed to claim the protection of the
Hague Convention and thus effectively consented to whatever method was used. Failure to
raise service objections in a timely fashion may result in their waiver. See Photolab Corp. v.
Simplex Specialty Co., 806 F.2d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 1986); Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194,
197-98 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Supreme Merchandise Co. v. Iwahori Kinzoku Co., 21 A.D.2d 193,
194, 503 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19-20 (1986).
222. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
223. See Cipolla, 496 A.2d at 132 (citing Vorhees, 697 F.2d at 575).
224. Whenever there is a direct conflict between statutes or treaties and statutes, the last in
time prevails. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933).
225. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967).
226. Id.
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III. But Is It Worth the Candle?-Enforcing Judgments
Against Alien Defendants Abroad
The evaluation of any approach to the question when American
courts can assert jurisdiction over alien defendants ultimately should
consider whether a judgment entered against the defendant may be en-
forceable outside United States' borders.2 27 It is true that some defend-
ants will comply, paying any judgment entered, and yet others more
recalcitrant may have property within the United States that may be used
to satisfy outstanding judgments. Neither of these solutions, however,
may be feasible in a wide range of other cases. 228 If so, all the efforts
spent in the litigation will be useless, unless the foreign courts agree to
honor the American court's judgment. That determination will depend,
at least in part,229 on whether the enforcing State acknowledges that the
227. Concerns about the binding effect of the judgment in terms of issue and claim preclu-
sion also exist. However, there are some important differences between foreign courts' recog-
nition of preclusion notions and their agreement to enforce American judgments, and the two
types of judgment effects should not be assumed to receive identical treatment. For example,
the reluctance of some countries to recognize notions of issue preclusion comparable to our
own may prevent that effect. See generally Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judg-
ments: Whose Law 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 62-70 (1984). Yet, the failure to give full recogni-
tion to the issues decided in a United States proceeding does not mean that enforcement of the
judgment that was reached will not be forthcoming. On the other hand, insofar as enforce-
ment and preclusion depend on finding adequate jurisdiction and notice, the question of what
is the foreign standard for assessing those criteria is the same in both contexts.
228. National political and economic concerns also compel that we at least consider
whether assertions of jurisdiction may be viewed as too self-serving in the international realm.
See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 16, at 1127; Note, The Long-Arm Reaches the Inter-
national Manufacturer-A Criticism, 8 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 54, 61 (1972).
229. Commonly recognized additional grounds for refusing enforcement are that the judg-
ment was obtained by fraud, or its recognition would be contrary to natural justice or public
policy. See G. CHESHIRE & P.M. NORTH, PRIVATE INT'L LAW 659-65 (10th ed. 1979) (Eng-
land); Blom, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada, 57 OR. L. REV. 399, 421-25
(1978); Brenscheidt, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 11 INT'L LAW. 261, 266-67 (1977); Comment, French Courts
Recognize Foreign Money Judgments: One Down and More to Go, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 72, 76-
77 (1964). These grounds also form the basis for attacking foreign court judgments in Ameri-
can courts. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 482. Additionally, several foreign countries
refuse enforcement if the judgment was entered in violation of a forum selection clause in a
contract. E.g., Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of 1982, ch. 27, § 32 (England); U.
DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INT'L LAW 350-51 (1972).
At one time reciprocity also typically was demanded, although it now generally has fallen
into disuse. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 481 comment d; E. SCOLES & P. HAY. CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 24.35 (1982). But see Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 665 F.2d
515 (5th Cir. 1981) (Texas includes reciprocity as ground for discretionary non-recognition);
GERMAN CODE OF CIV. PRO. § 328 1(5); R. CASAD, CIVIL JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND
THE INTEGRATION OF MULTIPLE-STATE ASSOCIATIONS 21 (1981) (Central America); T.
HATTORI & D. HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 11.02[l] (1985).
This Article is limited to exploring the two grounds for nonrecognition on which our
[Vol. 39
April 1988] JURISDICTION OVER ALIEN DEFENDANTS 845
United States court had the power to reach the alien defendant.230 Thus,
it becomes essential to consider questions of jurisdiction and notice not
only from an American viewpoint, but also from an international per-
spective to find what common ground may exist, as well as what pitfalls
to avoid.
As was discussed earlier,231 the adoption of the Hague Convention
on service of process in the United States and so many other countries
has provided a uniform standard to control notice methodology ques-
tions. A failure to follow those procedures or a lack of notice will mean
that any judgment that is reached will not be enforceable abroad. 232 An
inquiry into what constitutes sufficient jurisdiction to assure an enforcea-
ble judgment cannot be answered as easily.
The attempt to obtain some insights on that question must proceed
in two stages, recognizing that the scope of proper jurisdiction commonly
is defined differently depending on whether the issue is raised in initial
proceedings or later, during attempts at judgment enforcement. It is
widely recognized that in most foreign countries the rules governing
proper jurisdiction for enforcement purposes are much narrower than
those authorizing jurisdiction as a matter of first instance.2 33 For judg-
model approach is based: jurisdiction and notice. But it should be kept in mind that even if
those two criteria are satisfied, enforcement will not be forthcoming if one of the other grounds
is found applicable by the foreign court.
230. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 482 comment c.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 174-98.
232. In some countries, a failure of notice suggests that the judgment does not comport
with notions of natural justice or violates public policy and thus is unenforceable. See G.
CHESHIRE & P.M. NORTH, supra note 229, at 664; U. DROBNIG, supra note 229, at 351; R.H.
GRAVESON, CONFLIcT OF LAWS: PRIVATE INT'L LAW 632 (7th ed. 1974). Because of notice
concerns, it also is common for default judgments to be denied enforcement unless personal
service is accomplished. See R. CASAD, supra note 229, at 149-53. Japan takes these concerns
one step further and provides that judgments entered in suits against Japanese nationals will
not be enforced at all unless personal service was accomplished or the defendant appeared in
the action. See T. HATTORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 229, § 11.02[l].
233. See Campbell, Jurisdiction Over Absent Defendants in English and United States Law:
The Formulation of Jurisdictional Principles, 38 TUL. L. REV. 317, 324 (1964). Professor
Casad offers an explanation for this fact in R. CASAD, supra note 229, at 143.
In contrast, an American court will evaluate the jurisdiction of a foreign tribunal against
traditional American due process standards. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 482 com-
ment c, at 796. However, jurisdiction inquiries on foreign judgments do differ somewhat from
the treatment accorded sister state judgments under the full faith and credit clause. Recogni-
tion may be refused if jurisdiction is based solely on service within the foreign country and the
forum was inconvenient-essentially on grounds of forum non conveniens. Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act § 4(b), 13 U.L.A. 263 (1980). Further, § 5(a) of the Act,
which sets out six jurisdictional bases such that if a foreign judgment rests on one of them it
must be granted recognition, includes bases much more limited than usually recognized under
most state long-arm statutes. See Scoles & Aarnas, The Recognition and Enforcement of For-
ment purposes the question often asked is whether proper "international
jurisdiction" existed234 and courts look to their own country's rules on
conflict of laws to determine the answer.2 35 The internal jurisdiction rules
applicable to nonresident defendants may, in fact, be much broader.
236
The result of this phenomenon has been described most aptly by Profes-
sor Juenger: "[P]ursuant to the laws of several European nations, juris-
diction is largely controlled by the law of the jungle, and unfortunately
their recognition practices are as narrow as their jurisdictional assertions
are broad, except to the extent that treaties afford relief."
237
Consequently, it seems appropriate to consider not only whether a
judgment under our model approach would be likely to satisfy notions of
international jurisdiction, but also whether, if that is not so, it comports
with other countries' notions of internal jurisdiction. The first inquiry
responds to enforcement concerns; the second gives some indication
whether the use of our model would create any major disruption in the
international order. Although a comprehensive world-view is beyond
our abilities here, a sampling of several countries provides some insight
into those questions.
At present the United States has no treaties with any country re-
garding the general enforcement of money judgments.2 38 The only treaty
eign Nation Judgments: California, Oregon, and Washington, 57 OR. L. REV. 377, 387-88
(1978).
234. See G. CHESHIRE & P.M. NORTH, supra note 229, at 633; G. DELAUME, AMERICAN-
FRENCH PRIVATE INT'L LAW 160 (1961).
235. The effect of each enforcement court looking to its own conflicts laws rather than
some uniform standard is that there is little agreement on what constitutes "international juris-
diction." See Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Western Europe, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 367, 374 (1963).
236. For example, in England international jurisdiction is limited to residence and volun-
tary submission. See infra text accompanying notes 245-48. English courts, however, are em-
powered to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents in various actions involving contracts, as well
as when torts are committed substantially within the country. See G. CHESHIRE & P.M.
NORTH, supra note 229, at 91-93. In contrast, German courts will enforce a foreign judgment
only if the rendering court would have had jurisdiction under German law, thereby merging
their notions of internal and international jurisdiction. See deVries & Lowenfeld, supra note
13, at 339-40.
237. Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European Communities:
A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1205 (1984).
238. Two specialized agreements do exist. First, the United States entered into treaties
with Denmark, France, The Netherlands, and Sweden, among others, regarding the mutual
enforcement of one another's tax judgments. See Atik, The Problem of Reciprocity in Transna-
tional Enforcement of Tax Judgments, 8 YALE J. OF WORLD PUB. ORD. 156, 162 n.49 (1981).
Second, the United States signed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards, done at New York, June 10, 1958. 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997,
330 U.N.T.S. 4739. Thus, its arbitration awards will be enforced in other signatory states,
[Vol. 39THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
JURISDICTION OVER ALIEN DEFENDANTS
that appears to have been seriously pursued was with England.
239
Although the treaty was initialled in 1977, unfortunately it never was
adopted, allegedly because of serious reservations the English had re-
garding American tort and treble damage antitrust judgments. 240 Thus,
enforcement of American judgments abroad depends totally on the inter-
nal law of the enforcing state.241
Enforcement of foreign judgments commonly proceeds from notions
of comity. 242 Judgments are enforced, even in the absence of an agree-
ment to do so, as a matter of respect for the sovereign power of the ren-
dering state.243  Nonetheless, certain exceptions may prevent
enforcement. 244 Although each state determines for itself what excep-
tions to apply, a failure of jurisdiction typically is included. Because the
scope of the term "jurisdiction" depends upon the enforcing state's rules
subject to the terms and requirements of that convention. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra
note 8, § 487.
239. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 229, § 24.39, at 971.
240. The English antipathy to United States antitrust judgments is apparent most clearly
with the passage of the Protection of Trading Interests Act, ch. 11, § 5 (1980). For a discus-
sion of the Act, see Blythe, The Extraterritorial Impact of the Anti-Trust Laws: Protecting
British Trading Interests, 31 AM. J. CoMP. L. 99 (1983); Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Juris-
diction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981);
Comment, Foreign Blocking Legislation: Recent Roadblocks to Effective Enforcement ofAmeri-
can Antitrust Law, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 945. Similar reactions and legislation have appeared in
other Commonwealth nations. See Pettit & Styles, The International Response to the Extrater-
ritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697, 707-14 (1982).
241. Enforcement of foreign country judgments within the United States similarly depends
on finding whether the foreign court's assertion of jurisdiction comports with American stan-
dards. There is no uniform federal rule controlling the recognition of foreign judgments; the
issue generally has been considered a matter of state law, because it is not controlled by any
statute or treaty. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 481 comment a. The Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act governs practice in several states and sets out the common
exceptions to enforcement recognized in the United States. 13 U.L.A. 263 (1986).
242. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); see also Barry, Comity, 12 VA. L.
REV. 353 (1926).
England and the Commonwealth nations are exceptions to this rule. In England, foreign
judgments are enforced because the judgment is viewed as having created an obligation on the
part of the defendant. See Schibsby v. Westenholz, L.R. 6 Q.B. 115, 159 (1870); Williams v.
Jones, 13 W. & M. 633 (1845). Thus, English courts approach the problem by considering
whether the rendering court had the power to create a debt enforceable under English law,
requiring an inquiry into whether there was jurisdiction in the rendering court under English
conflict of law principles. A similar approach, relying on vested rights rather than comity is
used in Central America. See R. CASAD, supra note 229, at 17.
243. Not all countries acknowledge the need to respect each other's judgments. The
Netherlands, for example, refuses to recognize any foreign country money judgments in the
absence of a treaty. See Stein, Civil Procedure in INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW FOR FOR-
EIGN LAWYERS 258-59 (1978).
244. See supra note 229. Practice on what exceptions to enforcement exist varies widely
between countries. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, ch. 8, introductory note at 777-78.
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of conflict of laws, there is no clear international agreement on the ques-
tion of what constitutes sufficient jurisdictional power. A brief descrip-
tion of some of the varying rules will illustrate.
At one end of the spectrum lie England and the Commonwealth
nations.245 While sharing a common law tradition with the United
States, these nations recognize a most narrow definition of jurisdiction
for judgment purposes. Under English conflicts rules, a foreign court has
the power to enter a binding judgment only when the defendant is a resi-
dent in the forum country when the action is commenced or if the de-
fendant voluntarily submits246 to jurisdiction.24 7 A corporation will be
deemed a resident only if it has a permanent place of business in the
foreign country and does substantial business there; simply doing busi-
ness is not enough.248 Thus, an English individual who vacations in Cali-
fornia, rents a car there and then proceeds to have a collision injuring
several Californians, would be secure in the knowledge that should the
plaintiffs sue in California, any judgment they obtained would not be en-
forceable in England because the American court would not be deemed
to have proper international jurisdiction. Jurisdictional immunity also
can be claimed by English manufacturers who regularly send their prod-
ucts into the United States, but who maintain no places of business here.
Jurisdiction asserted under our model approach based on national con-
tacts would not be recognized; even jurisdiction asserted using the cur-
rent state contacts approach is outside the limited English view of
international jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction notions are somewhat broader in many civil law coun-
tries when evaluating whether to enforce a foreign judgment. 249 For ex-
245. For a comprehensive review, see K. PATCHETT, RECOGNITION OF COMMERCIAL
JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 1-191 (1984). Because Commonwealth
rules are so similar to those in England, they are not treated separately in this Article.
246. English notions of when defendant voluntarily submits are much narrower than
American ones. In particular, § 33 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act of 1982, ch.
27, provides that the defendant will not be deemed to have submitted if he has appeared in the
foreign proceeding to object to jurisdiction or to protect property seized in the proceeding. In
the federal courts in the United States, once defendant appears to contest jurisdiction, he must
pursue his objection by way of appeal and cannot later collaterally attack the judgment on the
jurisdiction grounds. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 95, § 3.26, at
184.
247. See G. CHESHIRE & P.M. NORTH, supra note 229, at 634-41; J. MORRIS, THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 111-15 (1984).
248. See G. CHESHIRE & P.M. NORTH, supra note 229, at 634-35; J. MORRIS, supra note
247, at 111-12.
249. For a discussion of the various rules regarding jurisdiction for judgments purposes
applicable in Common Market countries, see 2 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS:
APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES §§ 10.02-.05 (April 1986).
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ample, in Germany international jurisdiction notions are merged with
internal law and a foreign judgment may be enforceable250 if the render-
ing court would have had jurisdiction had it followed German law.251 It
has been said that these rules permit jurisdiction whenever there is a rea-
sonable connection between the forum and the persons involved or the
subject matter, but in any event more than transient service.252 Although
that statement seems to suggest that a broad test similar to the American
minimum contacts standard is utilized, that conclusion would be unwise.
Under the procedural codes applicable to German courts, as well as simi-
lar codes in countries such as Italy253 and Japan,254 various specific bases
of jurisdiction are set out that are very reminiscent of many American
long-arm statutes. Thus, proper jurisdiction under German law exists
when a tort has been committed or a contract is to be performed there, or
the suit involves property situated in the country.255
These more liberal views are by no means dominant among major
trading nations. France, for example, continues to maintain that in the
absence of a treaty or the voluntary submission of a French citizen to a
foreign tribunal, French courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all
French nationals. 256 Effectively, this means that American judgments
against French citizens are unenforceable in France regardless of what
jurisdiction approach is taken in the United States proceeding. 257
Against this background, judgments under our model approach that
are premised on territoriality and an assessment of national contacts
250. Germany still requires reciprocity, so that judgment enforcement may flounder on
that ground even if jurisdiction is proper, however. See U. DROBNIG, supra note 229, at 353-
61; Brendscheidt, supra note 229, at 268-73.
251. A similar approach is taken in Italy and Japan. See G. CERTOMA, THE ITALIAN
LEGAL SYSTEM 214 (1985); T. HATTORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 229, § 11.02[1] n.227.
252. See U. DROBNIG, supra note 229, at 353-61; Brenscheidt, supra note 229, at 265.
253. Nonresident aliens may be sued in Italian courts if the claim concerns tangible or
movable property in Italy or obligations that arise or are to be performed there. See G.
CERTOMA, supra note 251, at 91-92.
254. In Japan, jurisdiction may be asserted over nonresident aliens at the place of perform-
ance of an obligation, at their place of business if the claim arises out of that business or in tort
actions at the place of wrong. See T. HATrORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 229, at
§ 4.05[4].
255. See deVries & Lowenfeld, supra note 13, at 330-40; von Dryander, Jurisdiction in
Civil and Commercial Matters under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16 INT'L LAW. 671
(1982).
256. FRENCH CODE OF CIV. P. arts. 14-15; see Campbell, supra note 233, at 335;
Graupner, supra note 235, at 370.
257. An exception occurs if the French defendant fails to raise the exclusivity issue. Then
the court will look to see whether the American court had concurrent jurisdiction, which will
be determined by looking to the various potentially proper jurisdictional bases in French law
had suit been brought there. See G. DELAUME, supra note 249, § 10.03.
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seem likely to receive at least no worse a reception than those obtained
under the current state contacts standard. Insofar as jurisdiction is as-
serted on the basis of a state long-arm statute having criteria similar to
those used in some of the civil law countries, then, regardless of what
contacts are relevant to assess whether American notions of due process
are satisfied, any judgment should be fully enforceable. Conversely, in
countries such as France or England, which effectively do not recognize
any judgments premised on long-arm jurisdiction, judgment enforcement
will be prevented no matter what contacts the defendant has had with the
forum state or with the United States. Nonetheless, the gains flowing
from our model approach in rationalizing American law on this question,
as well as in expanding the possible circumstances when jurisdiction can
be asserted over alien defendants who, it must be remembered, may agree
to pay whatever judgment ultimately is entered, still support shifting to a
focus on national territorial power as a basis for jurisdiction in suits
against aliens. The only remaining question is whether that standard will
be viewed as exorbitant by other nations and thus should be avoided.
Two sources are useful in assessing that issue. First, it is worth not-
ing how the standards just described have been altered in those countries
that have entered into conventions or treaties with other nations regard-
ing judgment enforcement. 258 Of particular interest is the 1968 Brussels
Convention,259 which is a multilateral agreement among members of the
European Economic Community. The Convention provides not only
rules of enforcement, but also, more importantly, partially harmonized
standards for international jurisdiction among the signatory states.
260
258. Most European countries appear to handle foreign judgment enforcement by treaty
or Convention. See R. SCHLESINGER, H. BAADE, M. DAMASKA, P. HERZOG, COMPARATIVE
LAW 401-02 n.92 (5th ed. 1988); E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 229, at 970. England also
has entered into several treaties regarding foreign judgment enforcement. See Campbell, supra
note 233, at 323. For an examination of several existing treaties, see Graupner, supra note 235,
at 379-81.
259. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, done at Brussels, Sept. 27, 1968, reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 229 (1969),
revised by Convention on Accession to the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done at Luxembourg, Oct. 9, 1978, reprinted in
18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 8 (1979) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
260. The Brussels Convention has been examined in several books and articles. See, e.g.,
R.H. GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAWS: PRIVATE INT'L LAW 98-108 (7th ed. 1974); Bartlett,
Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis of the Provisions of the Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 24
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 44 (1975); Hay, The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments-Some Considerations of Policy and Interpreta-
tion, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 149 (1968); von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State
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Second, we will look briefly at some of the internal jurisdiction rules uti-
lized abroad to compare them to our proposed standard.
Under the Brussels Convention, jurisdiction may be asserted over
domiciliary defendants in signatory states only on the bases listed, but
any judgment then entered is fully enforceable in all nations party to the
Convention. Although domicile remains the primary basis for asserting
jurisdiction,261 specific alternative grounds are listed. For example, juris-
diction may be founded in contract actions at the place of performance 2 62
and in tort cases where the harmful act occurred.263 Additionally, juris-
diction may be asserted over a business that has a branch or establish-
ment in the forum if the claim arises out of the operation of that
branch. 264 As can be seen, these bases are comparable to, though some-
what narrower than, those found in many state long-arm statutes. 265
Since nations such as England and France are parties to the Convention,
they too have agreed to recognize international jurisdiction on these
grounds, even though, as already noted, they would not do so for judg-
ments from nonsignatory countries. Therefore, we at least may assume
that such bases of jurisdiction are not anathema, but, indeed, represent a
rather widely-shared view of acceptable practices.
Reference to the Convention's list of jurisdictional grounds also sug-
gests that a shift in American practice to a territorial theory premised on
national contacts would not be viewed with any particular concern inter-
nationally. The Convention's jurisdictional bases refer to contacts with a
particular country, not to a specific venue within that country. There are
two circumstances, however, in which jurisdiction would be upheld
under our approach, which require closer scrutiny.
There is a complete absence in the Convention's jurisdiction provi-
sions of anything comparable to American notions of general jurisdic-
tion. This raises the question whether it would be unacceptable for a
United States court to enter a judgment against an alien defendant who
has had substantial contacts with the forum, but whose contacts are un-
related to the underlying cause of action.266 Of course, if that is so, then
Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the European Economic
Community and the United States, 81 COLUM. L. R1nv. 1044 (1981).
A multilateral judgment recognition scheme also exists in Central America, although it
does not attempt to establish uniform jurisdiction standards. That scheme is examined most
thoroughly in R. CASAD, supra note 229.
261. Brussels Convention, supra note 259, art. 2.
262. Id. art. 5(1).
263. Id. art. 5(3).
264. Id. art. 5(5).
265. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 95, §§ 3.12-.13.
266. See Juenger, supra note 237, at 1207-08.
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current American standards that authorize general jurisdiction based on
state contacts would be as suspect as jurisdiction asserted using a na-
tional contacts model. The question remains whether a judgment pre-
mised on general jurisdiction simply would not be recognized or whether
that assertion of jurisdiction, in and of itself, would be viewed as
excessive.
The answer is not wholly clear. The Convention does set out certain
exorbitant bases of jurisdiction that it is agreed cannot be used against
domiciliaries of member states.267 None of those include references to
general jurisdiction. The only forbidden form that comes close is the
German practice of asserting in personam jurisdiction premised on the
presence of property in Germany.268 Objections to that form of jurisdic-
tion stem from concerns about the possible insubstantial nature of the
defendant's contact if it is allowed based on the presence of any property,
however fortuitous or small, and the failure to limit the judgment to the
value of the property. Because general jurisdiction is permissible under
American constitutional standards only when there has been substantial
contact, the same objections should not pertain. Nonetheless, it probably
would be dangerous to assume silence means acceptance. A more likely
explanation is that general jurisdiction as we know it in the United States
is not utilized in any of the signatory countries,269 thus not necessitating
its inclusion.
The list of recognized exorbitant jurisdictional bases does contain
something of specific interest, however. When England acceded to the
Convention in 1978, the list was expanded to included a reference to
transient jurisdiction, which still was permissible in the English courts. 270
Thus, insofar as premising American jurisdiction over alien defendants
on theories of territoriality appears to support allowing jurisdiction pre-
mised solely on the fact that the defendant was served with process while
present in the country, 27' that conclusion should be reevaluated. 272
267. Brussels Convention, supra note 259, art. 3. One of the major criticisms of the Con-
vention is that the listed exorbitant jurisdictional bases, although outlawed among signatory
States, may be used against domiciliaries of nonsignatory nations and any judgment so ob-
tained will be fully enforceable among Convention countries. See von Mehren, supra note 260,
at 1057-58.
268. GERMAN CODE OF CIV. P. at. 23.
269. See generally infra text accompanying notes 275-77.
270. Brussels Convention, supra note 259, art. 3(2).
271. See supra note 113.
272. The Convention also lists as exorbitant the German practice of asserting jurisdiction
based solely on the presence of property. Although at first glance this might seem to suggest
that quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the territorial power of property should fail, such is not
the case. The United States limitation of quasi in rem judgments to the value of the property
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Perhaps not surprisingly, looking outside the Convention at some of
the internal jurisdiction rules utilized by various countries leads to very
similar conclusions about possible international reaction to our model
approach. Jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries most often is premised on
the fact that a tort occurred in the place where suit is brought or the
dispute involves a contract having some relationship with that state. It
also may be asserted in disputes involving property if the property is
within the forum's control.273 Because these very contacts appear in
many of our long-arm statutes and are the basis for asserting proper spe-
cific jurisdiction under American law, their continued use in United
States litigation should pose few international repercussions. 274
The biggest question remains the acceptability of jurisdiction pre-
mised on unrelated contacts-general jurisdiction. The only comparable
approach abroad is the attempt when dealing with corporations to deter-
mine whether the entity is doing sufficient business within the forum to
be deemed "present" or "residing" there for jurisdiction purposes. 275
This inquiry often is limited to determining the principal place of busi-
ness or the "seat" of the defendant,276 however, it does not come close in
scope to American notions of general jurisdiction. At the same time, it
bears repeating that what may be unacceptable to the rest of the world is
not what contacts are deemed significant, state or national, but that unre-
lated contacts provide any support at all for the assertion of
attached distinguishes this form of jurisdiction from the exorbitant German model. Further,
in cases in which the claim for relief is totally unrelated to the property, the court's ability to
use forum non conveniens should protect against any "exorbitant" results. See supra note 113;
see also von Dryander, supra note 255, at 678-84.
273. See generally G. CERTOMA, supra note 251, at 91-92; G. DELAUME, supra note 234,
at 151-54; U. DROBNIG, supra note 229, at 321-22; R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 185 (1965); T. HATrORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 229, at
§ 4.05[4]; J. MORRIS, supra note 247, at 71-76; deVries & Lowenfeld, supra note 13, at 316-17
(France), 330-31 (Germany); von Dryander, supra note 255.
274. Although the jurisdictional bases are very specific in most civil law countries, a find-
ing that a particular case falls within them ends the inquiry and there is no need to look for
additional contacts, as would be required under American law. Thus, in some cases American
courts actually may be refusing jurisdiction that would be recognized internationally. As as-
serted by one commentator, for example, if the Volkswagen case had been decided under Ger-
man law, the fact that injury occurred in the forum would be sufficient to establish the
commission of a tort there and subject defendant seller to jurisdiction without any further
inquiry into the seller's contacts. See von Dryander, supra note 255, at 690-91.
275. See G. CHESHIRE & P.M. NORTH, supra note 229, at 79-83.
276. See G. DELAUME, supra note 249, § 8.13; deVries & Lowenfeld, supra note 13, at 307
(Switzerland). But cf T. HATTORI & D. HENDERSON, supra note 229, § 4.07[2] (if case has
international aspect and defendant company has some legal connection with Japan, that may




This brief review of judgment enforcement abroad reveals that,
although there are some significant barriers to enforcement, they would
not be exacerbated by adopting a jurisdictional scheme premised on terri-
torial power and an assessment of national contacts. Insofar as asser-
tions of jurisdiction in particular cases based on unrelated contacts or the
transient presence of the defendant in the United States might appear to




The current state of American law on the subject of when and how
to assert jurisdiction over alien defendants needs adjustment. Although
notice and service of process questions have received specialized treat-
ment, the failure to address adequately the unique jurisdictional concerns
in international litigation has been a serious problem. The main difficulty
has been the tendency to try to force what essentially is a special form of
litigation into molds developed for internal purposes. This has resulted in
confusion and in a failure to assert jurisdiction in cases in which doing so
would not have offended either our own due process notions or the sensi-
bilities of other nations.
Regardless of the court in the United States in which suit is filed,
jurisdiction in these international cases must be viewed as the assertion of
sovereign power by the nation over alien defendants. Correspondingly, it
should be tested by looking to the contacts of the defendant with the
nation as a whole. The inconvenience of a particular forum may be ad-
dressed through the ability of the courts to transfer cases and to dismiss
for forum non conveniens. Additional concerns about whether a particu-
lar case is dominated by foreign elements, suggesting that a foreign
state's interests would not favor American court adjudication on the
matter, also may be handled by application of already well-developed
forum non standards. Although this approach will not secure increased
enforcement abroad of American judgments, it at least is in keeping with
277. Interestingly, one form of jurisdiction recognized elsewhere that is considerably
broader than the American contacts standard is jurisdiction over multiple defendants. Juris-
diction is allowed on condition that one of the defendants is domiciled in the forum, or, in the
case of England, has been served within the jurisdiction. E.g.. Brussels Convention, supra note
260, art. 6(1); see G. DELAUME, supra note 249, § 8.14.
278. Forum non does not seem to be recognized in civil law countries. See Juenger, supra
note 237, at 1205, 1211. Nonetheless, its use by United States courts to resist jurisdictional
assertions that might be deemed intrusive by other countries will avoid any potential problems
and thus offers a needed safety valve to our jurisdictional scheme.
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what appears to be widely shared views of acceptable practice in other
countries. Perhaps a well-developed approach on our own part may be
the premise for some serious discussions with other nations concerning
future agreements on judgment enforcement.


